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This Article challenges the emerging consensus that
arbitrators who adjudicate investor-state disputes
should strive for greater consistency. It submits that
consistent adjudication can only be realized by sacrificing accuracy, sincerity and transparency. For
many nationaland supranationallegal systems, this is
a price worth paying to promote goals like equality,
certainty, predictability and perceived legitimacy of
dispute resolution. The case for privileging these
goals, however, loses much of its force in the context
of investment treaty arbitration. Substantive investment law, currently consisting of approximately three
thousand instruments, is fragmented and dynamic.
And due to its ad hoc character,arbitrationis flawed
as a vehicle for harmonizing law. For these reasons,
arbitrators in investor-state arbitrationsshould resist
any norm of precedent in the sense of deference to
earlier awards. At the same time, arbitratorsought to
be mindful that their awards contribute to the development of substantive law in an area of great public
importance. The Article concludes that the key lessons from precedent lie in its forward-looking aspects,
namely the decision-making and reason-giving responsibilities that flow from the notion that decisions
will have effects beyond resolution of the immediate
dispute.
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in the Associates and Fellows workshop at Columbia Law School and the terrific editors and
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INTRODUCTION

Investment treaty scholars increasingly embrace Justice
Brandeis's observation that "in most matters it is more important that
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 1 In1. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
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consistent awards and annulment decisions, they submit, threaten the
sustainability of the international investment regime. 2 While not everyone subscribes to the assessment that this regime is in the midst of
a "legitimacy crisis," there is an emerging consensus in the literature
that greater consistency in investment treaty arbitration would be desirable. Consistent adjudication promotes equality among litigants,
constrains idiosyncratic decision-making and increases the perception
of legitimacy of dispute resolution. It also results in incremental development of substantive law, creating some degree of certainty as to
the scope and contents of legal rules. 3 The concern for consistency
arises in investment treaty arbitration because of the public dimension of investor-state disputes, which always involve challenges to
acts by government parties. Moreover, many awards and annulment
decisions in investor-state cases get published, and arbitrators help
shape the content of substantive investment law through the interpretation of open-ended norms in investment treaties.
Yet the pursuit of consistency comes at a price: giving
weight to consistency in decision-making inevitably leads to a decrease in accuracy, sincerity and transparency. In this Article, I argue
that international investment law is better served by abandoning efforts to implement a consistency norm in favor of a more immediate
focus on the quality of decision-making and the merits of awards.
Rather than demanding greater coherence, we should ask that investment tribunals reach what they believe is the correct decision in
the case before them, in accordance with their independent assessment of what the law requires. Although earlier awards are often
useful in making this determination, consistency itself should rarely,
dissenting).
2. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a
Public Lav Sphere: The Standard olReview in Investor-State Arbitrations,35 YALE J. INT'L
L. 283, 299 (2010) (arguing that inconsistent decisions by arbitral tribunals in cases
involving similar facts are a threat to the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration); Christoph
Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, Conversations Across Cases Is There a Doctrine of
Precedent in Investment Arbitration?, 5 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT., at 8 18 (2008)
(characterizing conflicting awards as a "problem" and discussing several tools for
addressing the issue); see also Benedict Kingsbury & Stephen Schill, Investor-State
Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the
Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICAA
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 5, 8 n.7 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009)
(summarizing the literature about a "legitimacy crisis" in investment treaty arbitration).
3. See in/ha Parts IILA, III.B.4; cf Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)
("Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.").
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if ever, sway a tribunal. In sum, in investor-state disputes it is critical
that arbitrators try to identify the "right" rule, even if doing so leaves
4
the law unsettled.
It follows that investment arbitrators should not adopt precedent, in the sense of ascribing a constraining influence to earlier decisions. 5 As formulated by Larry Alexander, the force of precedent
manifests itself whenever "a subsequent court believes that, though a
previous case was decided incorrectly, it must, nevertheless, through
operation of the practice of precedent following, decide the case confronting it in a manner that it otherwise believes is incorrect." 6 At its
strongest, precedent imposes a formal obligation to follow decisions
from adjudicators that are higher up in a hierarchy. Proposals for
precedent in investment treaty arbitration tend to envision softer
forms-for instance, a (weak) presumption that earlier awards should
be followed, or a norm that attaches precedential value only to consistent lines of cases. 7 But the essence of precedent is that it imposes
a decisionalburden on an adjudicator. 8
I am not the first to object to the adoption of precedent in investment arbitration. Although some tribunals in investor-state cases
have suggested that arbitrators should aim to develop consistent
norms, others have resisted this notion. Tribunals in the latter camp
often note that there is no rule of precedent in international law, and
emphatically disclaim reliance on earlier awards. 9 In the academic
literature, Alexander Orakhelashvili has argued that reliance on earlier awards for the purpose of interpreting treaty provisions is prob4.

See infia Parts II.B, IJI.C.

5. See in/ra Part IV.A.
6.

Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent,63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1989).

7.

See infia Part I.B.

8. A practice of citing to or discussing earlier decisions does not constitute precedent
when adjudicators are under no constraint to give these decisions any weight in the decisionmaking process. Frederick Schauer put it as follows: "When the choice whether to rely on
a prior decisionmaker is entirely in the hands of the present decisionmaker, the prior
decision does not constrain the present decision, and the present decisionmaker violates no
norm by disregarding it." Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575 (1987)
[hereinafter Schauer, Precedent]. The view that constraint is the essence of precedent stands
in contrast to a broader approach, which would hold that "precedent" denotes any use of
earlier awards by adjudicators: "I [do not] argue that awards necessarily constrain the
discretion of future arbitrators . . . . As I use the term, arbitration generates precedent if
awards have some observable relevance to the future conduct of system participants." W.
Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory q Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1895, 1900-01(2010).
9.

See in/ra Part I.C.
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lematic in light of the absence of precedent from international law.
He also submits that conceptually, lawmaking by investment arbitrators is at odds with the authority of sovereign treaty-makers to create
the rules. ' 0 Others have sounded skeptical notes about precedent, observing that a certain level of incoherence in investment law is unavoidable due to the characteristics of the dispute resolution process. II
While my arguments build on these critiques, I go a step further by
taking up the normative claim that giving weight to consistency is
detrimental to the interests of parties to specific disputes and the investment community at large.
My position is motivated, in part, by the diminished force of
the main goals promoted by consistent adjudication-equality, continuity, predictability and the perception of legitimacy-in the international investment context. This is in part because of the dynamic nature of the field: substantive investment law, which consists of
approximately three thousand (mostly bilateral) treaties between sovereigns, is inherently fragmented. The constraints imposed by precedent are also in tension with key characteristics of arbitration, including the high level of party control over the appointment of the
tribunal. Most importantly, a focus on consistency inevitably distracts from criteria that pertain directly to the quality of decisionmaking. After all, a consistency norm matters precisely when it
would convince an arbitrator to reach an outcome or adopt a rule or
rationale that differs from the one she would have arrived at independently. Faced with this dilemma, an arbitrator might decide to
follow precedent that she believes does not reflect the best interpretation of the law. Alternatively, she could search for a way to reach the
desired result while purporting to maintain uniformity. The first option sacrifices accuracy, the second sincerity. Either course of action,
10. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Principles of Treaty Interpretation in the NAFTA
ArbitralAward on Canadian Cattlemen, 26 J. INT'L ARB. 159, 168-69 (2009).
11. See e.g., David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical
Perspectives on Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 513, 516 (2009) ("Any

discussion of coherency in the ICSID system must begin by noting that the root of the
problem is embedded very deeply in the structure of arbitration itself. Arbitration ... is not
in fact a system, but rather is a framework within which discrete and possibly unknown
private actions are taken."); (f

Judith Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to Be

Addressed or a Fact of Lil?, in 1 INVESTMENT

TREATY LAW:

CURRENT ISSUES

23, 27

(Federico Ortino, Audley Sheppard & Hugo Warner, eds., 2006) (arguing that inconsistency

is a fact of life even in well-developed legal systems); Devashish Krishan, Thinking About
BITs and BIT Arbitration: The Legitimacy Crisis That Never Was, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WALDE 107, 132 (Todd Weiler &
Freya Baetens, eds., 2011) (noting that the binary nature of investment arbitration makes it

an unusual vehicle for lawmaking).
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in turn, leads to a decrease in transparency by concealing the extent
of disagreement among adjudicators or by masking the motivating
reasons for decisions.
Importantly, I do not deny that the effects of awards in investment treaty cases extend to persons and entities beyond the parties to a dispute. Sovereigns respond to trends in awards when negotiating and drafting new investment treaties, and investors may take
the strength of investor protection into account when deciding
whether to pursue investment opportunities. Moreover, investment
awards influence the shape and content of substantive norms, even if
they have no precedential force. 12 Parties to later disputes will cite to
pertinent awards, and future tribunals will study past decisions. As a
result, it is not only unavoidable, but also desirable for investment
arbitrators to be mindful of the broader and longer-term impact of
their decisions. I submit, therefore, that the forward-looking aspects
of precedent are instructive for understanding how the lawmaking
function should affect the decision-making process in individual cases. Arbitrators in investor-state disputes should aim to contribute to
the development of substantive law by explaining why their interpretation of the law is correct (regardless of whether it accords with the
prevailing opinion in earlier awards) and by openly identifying points
on which they disagree with other tribunals. Awareness of the larger
impact of specific decisions may also operate as a disciplining force
that, on balance, results in better decisions in individual cases. 13
I develop my thesis in four Parts. Part I introduces some
basic characteristics of investment treaty arbitration, and describes a
recent instance of inconsistent adjudication by investment tribunals.
Part II presents proposals for the introduction of precedent in investment treaty arbitration. Part III scrutinizes the consistency ideal on
which the arguments for precedent are premised. It argues that in investment treaty arbitration, autonomous adjudication values should
take priority over consistency. Part IV reconciles the rejection of
precedent in the sense of a decisional constraint with the reality that
investment awards and decisions play an important role in shaping
the meaning of common terms in international investment law. It
submits that the key lessons for investment treaty arbitration lie in the

12. See, e.g., Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 2, at 5 (describing effects of awards and
decisions in investor-state arbitration beyond the resolution of the immediate dispute);
Anthea Roberts, Powver and Persuasionin Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Dual Role of
States, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 179 (2010) ("[T]ribunal awards in particular cases
informally contribute to the interpretation, and thus the creation, of the law.").
13.

See in/ra Part IV.B.
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forward-looking aspects of precedent.
I. INCONSISTENCY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION

In this Part, I provide a basic sketch of the background against
which the debate over consistency and precedent in investment treaty
arbitration is set. I start with a basic description of pertinent characteristics of international investment law. I then summarize several
awards and annulment decisions that were rendered in cases filed
about ten years ago by American investors against Argentina. These
awards and decisions present an ongoing, high-profile instance of inconsistent adjudication that has rendered the debate about precedent
particularly acute.
A. The Investment Law Framework

Investment arbitrators occupy a unique position in the arbitration universe. Investment disputes, which always involve a state party, often concern matters of great public interest. The public dimension of investment treaty arbitration has resulted in a high level of
transparency compared to other types of arbitration. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the only institution entirely devoted to investment arbitration, has adopted a
practice of transparency that is unusual for arbitration. ICSID lists
pending and concluded cases on its website. Although not all investment awards are published, a significant number are easily accessible on the internet. 14 The interests at stake have also moved some
tribunals to allow submission of amicus briefs by non-parties or to
5
open hearings to the public. 1
Importantly, investment arbitrators are the primary interpreters of international investment treaties. In these treaties, sovereigns
commit to protecting investments made by each other's nationals by
granting certain substantive rights. Typically, the treaty parties agree
to provide adequate compensation in case of expropriation, to accord
"fair and equitable treatment" and provide "full protection and secu14.

See

INTERNATIONAL

CENTRE

FOR

SETTLEMENT

OF

INVESTMENT

DISPUTES,

http:Hicsid.worldbank.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
15. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1286 94 [hereinafter Bjorklund, Emerging

Civilization]

(discussing developments toward increased transparency in investment

arbitration); Gus VAN

(2007) (same).

HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW

160 64
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rity" to investments, and to honor obligations made with regard to
investments. 16 By interpreting these open-ended standards, investment awards and annulment decisions contribute to the development
of substantive investment law. Investment arbitrators also play a role
in shaping customary international law, which is often invoked by the
parties.
International investment law, however, is not a "system" in
the sense in which most national legal regimes are. 17 Substantively,
there is no comprehensive multilateral investment treaty to which
sovereigns can accede. 18 Almost all investment treaties are negotiated between two sovereigns, and at present there are over three thousand bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Although many BIT provisions are identical, some variation exists. 19
The decentralized nature of the dispute resolution of choice,
arbitration, also contributes to the picture of fragmentation. 20 In16. CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 2 (2008); Susan D.
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
InternationalLaw Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1532 (2005)
[hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy Crisis].
17. Caron, supra note 11, at 516 17; qf ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 6 (2009) ("The analytical challenge presented by the investment
treaty regime for the arbitration of investment disputes is that it cannot be adequately
rationalized either as a form of public international or private transnational dispute
resolution."); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privily, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 256 (1995) ("[T]his is not a sub-genre of an existing discipline. It is
dramatically different from anything previously known in the international sphere."); but see
Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427,
463-68 (2010) (arguing that an international regime for investment is emerging despite the
bilateral nature of investment treaties, the decentralized nature of arbitration and the lack of
a multilateral international organization).
18. Rainer Geiger, The Multifaceted Nature of International Investment Law, in
APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 17, 18 (Karl P. Sauvant &
Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008) [hereinafter APPEALS MECHANISM] (describing
failed attempts to arrive at a multilateral solution).
19. See, e.g., Anna Joubin-Bret, The Growing Diversity and Inconsistency in the llA
System, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 18, at 137, 137 38 (examining variation in
approaches to the "fair and equitable treatment" standard in more than five hundred
investment treaties); Patrick Juillard, Variation in the Substantive Provisions and
Interpretation of InternationalInvestment Agreements, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note
18, at 81 (analyzing the relationship between variation in provisions in investment treaties
and seemingly inconsistent results in awards); cf'Barton Legum, Options to Establish an
Appellate Mechanism .lrInvestment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 18, at
231, 234-35 (noting that even treaty provisions that are facially similar may need to be
interpreted differently based on the apparent intent of the negotiating states).
20.

Several authors have commented on the hybrid nature of investment arbitration, as
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vestment treaties typically allow investors to bring claims in one of
several forums, including ICSID. 2 1 Tribunals usually consist of three
arbitrators: two party-appointed arbitrators and a chair appointed in
accordance with the parties' agreement. 22 There is no appellate instance to promote uniformity. Instead, ICSID awards are subject to
review under the ICSID annulment procedure. 2 3 Decisions on applications for annulment are made by ad hoc committees appointed by
the Chairman of the Administrative Counsel of ICSID. 24 Annulment
can only be rendered on limited grounds, which mostly concern pro25
cedural irregularities and do not include substantive incorrectness.
An annulment committee cannot substitute its opinion for that of the
tribunal: its only options are to annul an award or let it stand. 26

well as the inherent tension between the public nature of the interests involved in investment
law and the selection of a contractual and quintessentially private mechanism as the dispute
resolution process. Stephan Schill has coined the term "public law challenge" to capture the
dilemmas that arise from this tension.
Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International
Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New
Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 57, 58-59, 67 (2011); see also Susan D. Franck,
The Nature and Enforcement oflInvestor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment
Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 69-79 (2005)
[hereinafter Franck, Investor Rights].
21. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 1541; see also Andrew P. Tuck,
Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed
Relbrms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAW & BuS. REV. AM. 885, 886
(2007).
22. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
23. The Convention precludes recourse outside of the ICSID framework, effectively
shielding ICSID awards from enforcement challenges in the courts of the host state. See id.
art 53(1) (providing that ICSID awards "shall not be subject to any appeal or other remedy
except those provided for in this Convention"); see also Dohyun Kim, Note, The Annulment
Committee's Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move
Away from an Annulment-Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 251-52 (2011). NonICSID investment awards could be set aside by a court at the seat of the arbitration, and are
subject to the (limited) grounds for non-enforcement under the New York Convention. See
Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option? The Debate About an ICSID Appellate Structure,
in 57 BEITRAGE ZUM TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 5, 11 (2006).
24.

ICSID Convention, supra note 22, art. 52(3).

25. The grounds for annulment are improper constitution of the tribunal, manifest
excess of the tribunal's powers, corruption of a tribunal member, serious departure from a
fundamental procedural rule or failure to state the reasons in the award. Id., art. 52(l)(a)

(e).
26. One annulment committee has made the oft-quoted observation that "the role of an
ad hoc committee is a limited one, restricted to assessing the legitimacy of the award and not
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B. A Case Study of InconsistentAdjudication
Arbitral tribunals in investor-state disputes are in agreement
on many issues. 27 Scholars have long argued, however, that the
characteristics of both the substantive law and the dispute resolution
mechanism render investment treaty arbitration vulnerable to inconsistent adjudication. 28 And while the discussion may once have been
mostly an academic one, one can no longer deny that tribunals have
29
rendered inconsistent decisions about controversial issues.
The calls for increased consistency in investment treaty arbitration have intensified as a result of a high-profile instance of inconsistent decision-making in cases brought by investors against Argentina in connection with the measures taken by the government in
2001-02 to address the severe economic downturn. Five cases involved claims filed under the Argentina-United States BIT by American investors: CMS Gas Transmission Co., LG&E Energy Corp.,
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., Sempra Energy International and

its correctness."
M.C.I. Power Group L.C. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/6, Annulment Decision, 1 24 (Oct. 19, 2009); see also David D. Caron, Reputation
and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between
Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID REV. 21, 24 25 (1992); CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE
ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 892 (2001).
27. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, s Consistency a Myth?, in PRECEDENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 137, 138-41 (Yas Banifatemi ed., 2007) [hereinafter
Kaufmann-Kohler, Consistency] (noting consistency in arbitral decisions on (1) the
distinctions between treaty and contract claims and (2) the fair and equitable treatment
standard).
28. See, e.g., Franck, Investor Rights, supra note 20, at 69; Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 373-75
(2007) [hereinafter Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent]; Kaufmann-Kohler, Consistency,
supra note 27, at 143-47; Valentina Vadi, Towards Arbitral Path Coherence & Judicial
Borrowing: Persuasive Precedent in Investment Arbitration, 5 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT., at
5 14(2008).
29. See, e.g., Kaufmann-Kohler, Consistency, supra note 27, at 142-43 (noting
inconsistency in arbitral decisions on (1) umbrella clauses, and (2) the state of necessity).
On the well-known Lauder dispute, in which two UNCITRAL tribunals reached different
outcomes in cases that involved the same facts but were brought under different treaties,
compare Franck, Investor Rights, supra note 20, at 60-61 (discussing these awards as
examples of inconsistency), wivith Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in
APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 18, at 241, 249 [hereinafter Paulsson, Unintended
Consequences] (arguing that the different outcomes can be attributed to the tribunals'
assessment of the facts, and that the awards are not inconsistent in a meaningful sense
because "[t]heir understanding of the relevant legal standards . . . were perfectly
congruent").
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Continental Casualty Co. 30 The claims of these investors are based
on the same government acts. In evaluating those acts, the tribunals
and annulment committees interpret the terms of a single BIT, as well
as a defense under customary international law that was invoked in
every case. As a result, these cases present a good starting point for
an examination of the role consistency and precedent should play in
investment treaty arbitration. The awards and decisions have been
analyzed extensively in other publications, 31 so my discussion here
will be brief.
The operative facts in the five cases are substantially similar.
The claimants invested in Argentine companies as part of Argentina's privatization program in the early 1990s. In these investment
transactions, Argentina made commitments aimed at stabilizing the
tariff structure in case of fluctuation of the peso. 32 During the unprecedented economic meltdown approximately ten years later, the
Argentine government effectively abrogated the stabilization
measures. 33 The investors who filed claims with ICSID claimed that
Argentina's actions violated several obligations under the BIT, including the obligations to accord fair and equitable treatment to investments and to honor commitments made to investors. 34 The disagreements among the adjudicators in these cases center on
30.

CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,

Award (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award]; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine

Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment Decision (Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter
CMS Annulment Decision]; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award]; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Annulment Decision (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Enron
Annulment Decision]; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Decision on Liability];

Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28,
2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award]; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/16, Annulment Decision (June 29, 2010) [hereinafter Sempra Annulment
Decision]; Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept.
5, 2008) [hereinafter Continental Award], Annulment Decision (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter

Continental Annulment Decision].
31. See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Dense:
Continental Casualty v. Argentina, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW &
PoLIcY 2010 2011, at 319 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012); David Schneidennan, Judicial
Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation f)r Conflicting
Outcomes, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383 (2010).
32. See, e.g., CMS Award, supra note 30,
of such a commitment by Argentina).
33. E.g., id. 1]165.
34.

E.g., id. 11]88.

53 57 (describing CMS's understanding
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Argentina's argument that it was not liable under the necessity defense under customary international law and the BIT's emergency
clauses, chiefly Article XI. 3 5 In CMS, Enron and Sempra, the tribunals held that Argentina did not meet the standards for either defense. 36 The LG&E and Continental tribunals, on the other hand,
held that Argentina had successfully established the emergency de37
fense under the BIT.
The conflicting outcomes are at least in part the result of disagreement about the relationship between the defenses under, respectively, the treaty and customary international law. 38 In Article XI of
the BIT, Argentina and the United States reserved the right to take
"measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration
of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests." 39 This treaty text provides little guidance regarding the conditions under which the necessity defense applies. In
contrast, Article 25 of the International Law Commission's Articles
on State Responsibility, which codifies the emergency defense under
customary international law, lists specific elements.
CMS Award: The inconsistencies already materialized in the
first two awards, rendered in the CMS and LG&E cases in May 2005
and October 2006. The CMS tribunal concluded that Argentina had
failed to establish either of the two defenses. 40 Among other reasons,
the tribunal found that while Argentina's crisis was severe, it "did
not result in total economic and social collapse." It held that, as a re41
sult, the crisis in and of itself could not preclude wrongfulness.
Significantly, in making this determination the CMS tribunal first analyzed the customary international law defense. It then incorporated
aspects of this analysis in its subsequent assessment of whether Ar35.

See, e.g., id. ] ] 91-99.

36. Id. 331; Enron Award, supra note 30, TT 313, 321, 339; Sempra Award, supra
note 30, 388.
37. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30,
note 30,
219 22, 266.

257 63; Continental Award, supra

38. My analysis of these disagreements draws on an illuminating presentation by
Michael Nolan titled The Dynamic Relationship Between the Customary InternationalLaw
of Investment Protection and Bilateral Investment Treaties (Columbia Law School
International Investment Law and Policy Speaker Series, Mar. 19, 2012).
39. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 103 2.
40.

CMS Award, supra note 30, 1331.

41.

Id. 111320, 355.
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gentina could successfully invoke the treaty defense. 42
LG&E Award: The LG&E tribunal, on the other hand, addressed the treaty defense first. 4 3 The tribunal noted that "[a]ll of the
major economic indicators reached catastrophic proportions in December 2001 .,44 It summarized the resulting poverty, lack of trust in
the banking system, deadly riots and political crisis, 45 and concluded
that "[a]ll of these devastating conditions-economic, political, social-in the aggregate triggered the protections afforded under Arti' 46
cle XI of the [BIT] to maintain order and control the civil unrest."
The LG&E tribunal's factual assessments as to the severity of the
conditions in Argentina, in sum, differed from those of the CMS tribunal. The LG&E tribunal held that the conditions for necessity existed between December 1, 2001 and April 26, 2003, and that Argentina's obligations revived after this period. 47 While noting that its
ruling on the treaty defense was sufficient, 4 8 the tribunal proceeded to
also analyze the customary international law defense. The LG&E
tribunal concluded that Argentina met the conditions for this defense
as well. 49 Remarkably, the LG&E tribunal referenced the CMS
award several times for propositions with which it was in agreement. 50 Yet the LG&E Award does not acknowledge, and therefore
fails to shed light on, the differences in reasoning and outcome in the
two awards.
Enron Award: The Enron tribunal issued its award in May
2007. The tribunal followed the CMS approach: after analyzing Argentina's defense under customary international law and concluding
that Argentina fell short, 5 1 the tribunal effectively noted that the Article XI defense was to be evaluated under the same standards. 52 Un42. See, e.g., id. 374 (noting that the review under the treaty defense "is a substantive
review that must examine whether the state of necessity or emergency meets the conditions
laid down by customary international law and the treaty provisions and whether it thus is or
is not able to preclude wrongfulness").

43.

LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, 111226-242.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. 1111233-36.

46.

Id. 11237.

47.

Id.

232.

261.

48. Id. 1 245.
49.

Id. 1111245-260.

50.

See, e.g., id.

51.

Enron Award, supra note 30, T7303 13.

52.

Id. 1111333-34, 339.

125 & nn.30 31, 127, 128 & nn.31 & 33, 236 n.35, 171 & nn.48

49.
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like the CMS tribunal, the Enron tribunal offered an explicit justification for this approach. Specifically, the Enron tribunal addressed an
expert opinion from Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White
opining that a treaty, as lex specialis, is distinct from and takes priority over customary international law. The tribunal agreed that "a treaty regime specifically dealing with a given matter will prevail over
more general rules of customary international law." It stated, however, that this was not the situation presented by the U.S.-Argentina
BIT: "[T]he problem is that the [BIT] itself did not deal with these
elements. The [BIT] thus becomes inseparable from the customary
law standard insofar as the conditions for the operation of state of necessity are concerned." 53 The Enron tribunal cited the LG&E Decision on Liability in support of specific propositions on which the two
tribunals agreed, 54 but did not account for the glaring inconsistencies
between the two awards.
CMS Annulment Decision: In the meantime, the CMS case
had proceeded to annulment, and the CMS annulment decision came
out on September 25, 2007. The annulment committee harshly criticized the CMS award on the merits. Much of this criticism centered
on the tribunal's conflation of the necessity and emergency defenses.
After pointing out textual and substantive differences between Article
XI of the BIT and Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility,
the annulment committee concluded that the tribunal's failure to distinguish between the two standards constituted "a manifest error of
law." 55 The annulment committee also identified an error in the application of the two sources of law. It explained that Article XI goes
to wrongfulness, meaning that necessity precludes a finding that a
breach has occurred, while Article 25 could be interpreted as going to
either wrongfulness or liability. 56 If both sources address wrongfulness, Article XI would be the lex specialis as to that issue and apply
at the exclusion of customary law. 57 If, instead, Article 25 addresses
liability, it would be a secondary rule that the tribunal should consider only after determining that Article XI did not preclude a breach. 58
Under either interpretation, in other words, the tribunal should have
given priority status to Article XI. Noting the limited nature of the
annulment remedy, the committee let the award stand, aside from a
53.

Id.

54.

Id. 1111260, 261, 261 nn.59-60, 262 n.63, 263 nn.66-68, 264 n.74.

334.

55.

CMS Annulment Decision, supranote 30, 111129-30.

56.
57.

Id.
129, 132.
Id. 11133.

58. Id. 11134.
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partial annulment relating to a different
issue that did not affect the
59
validity of the award as a whole.
Sempra Award: The inconsistencies persisted through the last
two awards, rendered in the Sempra and Continental cases. The
Sempra tribunal issued an award on September 28, 2007, i.e., three
days after the CMS annulment decision was rendered. The Sempra
tribunal essentially followed the approach taken by the CMS and Enron tribunals, with the same result. 60 Among other things, like the
CMS and Enron tribunals, the Sempra tribunal invoked customary international law in determining the standards for application of the
treaty defense. 6 1 One explanation for the similarities in approach
taken by the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals lies in the overlap in
arbitrators. Francisco Orrego-Vicufia chaired all three tribunals. 62 In
addition, Marc Lalonde sat on both the CiMS and the Sempra tribunals, and in both cases had been selected by the plaintiffs. 63 Interestingly, the Sempra award expressly notes that members of the tribunal
sat on other cases complaining of the same measures by the Argentine government. It also observes that some cases involved the same
counsel on each side and that the party submissions contained similar
or even identical language. 64 However, the tribunal hastened to add
that although "[o]n occasion, the wording [in the Senipra award] resembles that of prior awards[,] [t]he Tribunal ... has examined every

single argument and petition on the basis of their merits in this proceeding. '' 65 Unlike other tribunals, the Senipra tribunal acknowledged the inconsistency with the LG&E award (it did not address the
CMS annulment decision, and the tribunal members may not have
been aware of its existence given that it was hot off the press). The
Sempra award, however, seems to gloss over fundamental differences
in interpretation by the two tribunals. Instead, it plays up the different assessment of facts:
This tribunal must note, first, that in addition to differences in the legal interpretation of the Treaty in this
59.

Id.

60.

Sempra Award, supra note 30, 1388.

163.

61.

Id.

378.

62. See CMS Award, supra note 30,
Award, supra note 30, 10.

11; Enron Award, supra note 30,

63.

CMS Award, supra note 30, 110; Sempra Award, supra note 30, 110.

64.

Sempra Award, supra note 30, 176.

12; Sempra

65. Id. 76. See also id. 346 (noting, as to Argentina's emergency and necessity
defenses, "while two arbitrators sitting in the present case were also members of the tribunal
in the CMS case the matter has been examined anew").
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context, an important question that distinguishes the
LG&E decision on liability from CMS, and for that
matter also from the recent award in Enron, lies in the
assessment of the facts. While the CMS and Enron
tribunals have not been persuaded by the severity of
the Argentine crisis as a factor capable of triggering
the state of necessity, LG&E has considered the situation in a different light and justified the invocation of
emergency and necessity, albeit for a limited period of
time. This Tribunal, however, is not any more persuaded than the CMS and Enron tribunals about the
crisis justifying the operation of emergency and necessity .... 66
Continental Award:

The Continental tribunal, which ren-

dered its award on September 5, 2008, honored Argentina's treaty defense. Like the LG&E tribunal and the CMS annulment committee,
the Continentaltribunal rejected the position, taken by the other three
tribunals, that the treaty and customary law defenses are "inseparable." 67 Yet while the LG&E tribunal engaged purely in textual analysis to determine whether the evidence established the defense, the
Continental tribunal turned to sources outside the investment treaty
context for guidance. Noting that Article XI could eventually be
traced back to a provision in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) of 1947,68 the Continental tribunal examined GATT

and WTO case law on necessity.69
The different interpretation methods in Continental and
LG&E resulted in inconsistent rulings on damages. Specifically, the
LG&E tribunal held that Argentina breached its BIT obligations, but
was exempted from liability for any damages incurred during the
66.

Id. 1 346.

67.

Continental Award, supra note 30, 1 192.

68.

Id.

69. Id. Although the LG&E and the Continental tribunals both honored Argentina's
necessity defense under the BIT, the awards differ in their analysis of the operation of the
treaty defense, resulting in inconsistent rulings on the extent of Argentina's liability. Among

other things, the LG&E tribunal held that Article XI only shielded Argentina from liability
during the state of necessity, and that its BIT obligations (and therefore its liability for
violations) reemerged once the state of necessity had passed. LG&E Award, supra note 30,
1 261. The Continental tribunal, on the other hand, held that due to the protections accorded
by Article XI, the measures taken by Argentina during the economic collapse were not in
breach of the BIT obligations.

Continental Award, supra note 30,

164.

As a result, the

claimants were entitled only to damages that resulted from measures taken after the crisis
was over. Id. 1111220-22.
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state of necessity. The LG&E tribunal concluded that Argentina's liability reemerged after the state of necessity was over. 70 The Continental tribunal, on the other hand, held that the measures taken by
Argentina during the economic collapse were not in breach of the
71
BIT obligations as a result of applicability of the necessity defense.
The claimants' entitlement to damages was therefore limited to those
that resulted from measures taken after the crisis was over. 72 The
Continental award cites the CMS annulment decision several times
for support. 73 The Continental award also, at times, identifies discrepancies with earlier awards. For example, the award notes that the
Continental tribunal disagreed with the CMS tribunal on the legal
question of the level of severity that is necessary to trigger application of the treaty defense in case of an economic crisis. 74 The Continental tribunal also noted that its factual assessment of the gravity of
the Argentine crisis differed from that of other tribunals. 75 The
award, however, does not address the main areas of disagreement
with the approach taken by the LG&E tribunal regarding liability.
Enron and Sempra Annulment Decisions: The Enron and
Sempra annulment committees annulled the two awards under their
review based on excess of powers due to the failure of the tribunal to
apply the applicable law. 76 However, the two tribunals followed dif70.

LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, TT 257 63.

71.

Continental Award, supra note 30, TT 219, 266.

72.

Id. 111220-22.

73. See, e.g., id. TT 164 & n.236, 165 & n.239, 167 & n.242, 168 & n.246; qf id.
180 & n.261 (identifying agreement with the LG&E tribunal), 188 & n.282 (citing to the
CMS, LG&E and Enron awards).
74. Specifically, after discussing its view that application of the treaty defense does not
hinge on the existence of a "total collapse" or a "catastrophic situation," the Continental
tribunal notes: "In this respect this Tribunal takes a different view than that expressed in the
CMS Award ....
We note that Art. 25 of the ILC Articles, which is more restrictive than
Art. XI, admits recourse to necessity at para. 1(a) to safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril." Id. 180 & n.264 (citations omitted).
75. Id. 11178 & n.259 (citing to the CMS, LG&E and Enron awards for support of the
position that "'there is nothing in the context of customary international law or the object
and purpose of the treaty that could on its own exclude major economic crises from the
scope of Art. XI"' but noting that earlier tribunals "have taken a different evaluation in
concreto as to the gravity of the Argentine economic crisis").
76. Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 30,
196 219; Enron Annulment
Decision, supra note 30,
386 95. The Continental and LG&E cases also proceeded to
annulment. The Continental annulment committee let the award stand. Continental
Annulment Decision, supra note 30. In LG&E, the parties have suspended the proceedings.
See case and docket information, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (requiring search input). In Enron and Sempra, new tribunals
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ferent analyses. The Sempra committee ruled that the tribunal had
failed to apply the pertinent BIT provisions because it had used customary international law as the primary source of law. 77 The Enron
annulment committee, in contrast, based the annulment primarily on
its conclusion that the tribunal had failed to apply customary international law. 78 The Enron annulment committee addressed the CMS
annulment decision several times, including in at least one area of
79
disagreement.
Not only do the annulment decisions represent different substantive approaches, but they also reveal divergent views regarding
the proper application of the "manifest excess of powers" ground for
annulment. 80 Despite pointing out several "manifest error[s]" in the
award, the CMS annulment committee, as noted, let the award stand.
In so deciding, the CMS committee noted that wrong application of
the law does not constitute manifest excess of powers, and that it
"cannot simply substitute its own view of the law and its own appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal." 8 1 The Enron and Sempra annulment committees, on the other hand, engaged in a more aggressive application of the annulment ground. Neither the Enron nor
the Sempra decision discusses the reasons for taking an approach that
differs from the CMS annulment decision. 82

have been appointed.
well. Id.

However, in Enron the parties have suspended the proceedings as

77.

Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 30, 11 196-219.

78.

Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 30, [ [ 386-95.

79. For example, the Enron annulment committee held that the tribunal had provided
adequate reasons for its ruling that Argentina had violated the umbrella clause. The
committee noted that the CMS committee had held differently, and proceeded to explain this
difference based on differences in the awards the two committees were asked to annul. Id.

1111333-343.
80. This Article focuses on the case for consistency and precedent with regards to
substantive international law. However, I should note that the argument for precedent may
be stronger as to issues that go directly to the functioning of investment treaty arbitration
process itself, such as the interpretation of the grounds for annulment under the ICSID
Convention. In part, this is because the problem of fragmentation is not presented since the
ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty. Another reason is that arguably, considerations of
perception of legitimacy should weigh heavier as to questions that pertain directly to the
legitimacy of the process, especially because of the traditional emphasis on process in the
review of arbitral awards.
81.

CMS Annulment Decision, supranote 30, [ 136.

82. The Enron annulment decision, however, criticized the CMS annulment committee
for opining on the relationship between the treaty and customary international law defenses,
stating:
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IMPLEMENTING PRECEDENT

In this Part, I discuss several proposals for precedent in investor-state arbitration. First, I provide a brief overview of the status of
adjudicatory decisions in light of the ICSID Convention and the most
relevant rules of international law. I then proceed with a general discussion of the different degrees of precedent, followed by summaries
of the two main proposals for implementing precedent in investment
treaty arbitration: the use of persuasive precedent to promote consistency, and the introduction of some doctrine of jurisprudence constante. I conclude this Part with some examples of positions endorsed by tribunals and annulment committees.
A. The Status ofAdjudicatory Decisions
Although the case for precedent in investment treaty arbitration is based primarily on a desire for consistency, it raises important
underlying questions about how arbitrators should determine what
the law is and how it ought to be applied. A brief discussion of the
international law framework is therefore in order.
The ICSID Convention instructs arbitrators to "decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the
parties." If no such agreement exists, "the [t]ribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the dispute.., and such rules of
international law as may be applicable." 83 The debate about precedent centers on the methods arbitrators should follow in identifying
and applying "rules of international law."
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is widely considered to be authoritative, provides some
guidance. 84 It identifies three primary sources of international law:
international treaties, customary international law and "general prin-

[T]he substantive operation and content of Article XI and the customary international law principles of necessity, and the interrelationship between the two,
are issues that fall for decision by the tribunal. The role of an annulment committee is not to reach its own conclusions on these issues, but to determine
whether the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers in reaching the conclusion
that it did, or whether the tribunal failed to state reasons for reaching the conclusions that it did.
Enron Annulment Decision, supranote 30,

405.

83.

ICSID Convention, supra note 22, art. 42(1).

84.

See, e.g.,

Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty

Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1014, 1026-27 (2007).
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ciples of law recognized by civilized nations." 85 The provision further identifies "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" as "subsidiary means

for the determination of the rules of law." 86 The authorization to use
"subsidiary means" is made subject to Article 59 of the Statute,
which provides that a decision from the International Court of Justice
"has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
that particular case." 87 In sum, under Article 38(1) judicial decisions
do not possess the status of law. They may, however, be used for
purposes of determining the law.
The law on interpreting treaties attaches even less authority to
adjudicatory decisions. The rules for interpretation methods for treaties, including investment treaties, are codified in the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention). 88 Under Article 31
of the Vienna Convention, treaties are to be interpreted "in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." 89 Although Article 32 permits the use of "supplementary
means of interpretation," this provision does not expressly identify
adjudicatory decisions or awards. 90
85. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l)(a) (c), 59
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
86. Id. art. 38(l)(d); see also Cheng, supra note 84, at 1026 30 (discussing the
relevance of this provision for the status of investment awards).
87. Id. art. 59. Some investment treaties provide similar provisions. See, e.g., North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1136, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057
(1994), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (specifying that "[a]n award made by a tribunal shall have no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of the particular case"). Some have
read the statement in Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention that an award "shall be binding
on the parties" as implying that arbitral awards cannot constitute binding precedent. ICSID
Convention, supra note 22, art. 53(1); SCHREUER, supra note 26, at 1082.
88.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1165 U.N.T.S. 331.

89.

Id. art. 31 (emphases added).

90. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides two examples of "supplementary
means of interpretation," namely "the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion," and specifies that recourse to these means is appropriate "in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Id. art. 32.
Orakhelashvili observes that these two examples relate directly to the treaty-makers' intent
at the time of negotiation of the treaty.
He argues that because the examples are
qualitatively different from decisions rendered by adjudicators after a treaty has entered into
force, the better inference is that adjudicatory decisions are not appropriate as supplementary
means of interpretation of treaty texts. Orakhelashvili, supranote 10, at 168.
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As for customary international law, some scholars have argued that arbitral awards could be indicative of the two elements of
customary international law: state practice and opinio juris.9 1 The
argument is that the existing treaties, combined with arbitral awards
interpreting them, can come to represent customary international law
(rather than lex specialis) and bind even those states that aren't signatories to investment treaties. 92 This approach is, however, a controversial one that doesn't fit easily within traditional notions of treaty
law and customary international law. 93
In addition to the absence of a formal basis for precedent in
international law, the lack of a hierarchical structure poses challenges
for implementing any form of precedent. 94 As we will see, proposals
for the implementation of precedent into the investment treaty arbitration context are sensitive to these difficulties.
B. Adapting Precedentfor the Investment Treaty Context
Proponents of precedent in investment arbitration stop short
of arguing for binding precedent. Instead, some propose that arbitrators rely more heavily on persuasive authority. Others call for the
adoption of a practice akin to the French doctrine of jurisprudence
constante, which attaches precedential value to consistent lines of

cases.

91.

See, e.g., Kaufinann-Kohler, Consistency, supra note 27, at 147.

92. For the argument that BITs, and the way they are interpreted in arbitral awards, can
rise to the level of customary international law (or, as argued by Lowenfeld, international
law more generally), see, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 17 (2009) [hereinafter Alvarez, Custom]; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment
Agreements and InternationalLaw, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 (2003); Stephen M.
Schwebel, The Influence of BilateralInvestment Treaties on Customary InternationalLaw,
98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 27 (2004).
93. See, e.g., Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs Representing the "New" Customary
InternationalLawi?, 28 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 675 (2010) (rejecting the position that the
BITs represent customary international law and arguing that BITs cannot establish state
practice and opinio juris); see also Alvarez, Custom, supra note 92, at 19 (explaining the
controversy regarding the idea that BITs have a role to play in determining customary
international law).
94. 1 have discussed some of the difficulties that arise in trying to implement precedent
in a horizontal context in Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of
Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1109, 1190-95 (2012).
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1. Degrees of Precedent
The essence of precedent, as it is traditionally understood, is
that earlier decisions constrain the decision-making freedom of a pre96
sent adjudicator. 95 The degree of constraint, however, may vary.
Within the formal structure of the federal courts system of the United
States, for example, the amount of deference owed to earlier decisions depends primarily on jurisdiction and hierarchy. A brief explanation of this system will provide a useful framework for understanding the proposals regarding precedent in investor-state arbitration.
The 1987 Seventh Circuit opinion in Colby v. J.C. Penney
Co., authored by Judge Posner, identifies different levels of constraint that may exist within a precedent system. 97 The strongest
form is binding precedent, which imposes an absolute obligation on
lower court judges to follow the decisions from courts further up in
the hierarchy. 9 8 Although the highest courts may overrule earlier decisions under such a model, the principle of stare decisis demands
that they do so only in rare circumstances. 99
For purposes of understanding the form precedent could take
in a horizontal context, the treatment of decisions that are not binding
is most illuminating. The Colby case presents the issue nicely. In
this case, appeal was taken from the dismissal of a sex discrimination
case by a judge in the Northern District of Illinois. The district court
appeared to have based its ruling on an earlier decision from a judge
in the Eastern District of Michigan, which involved an identical
claim brought against the same defendant by a different plaintiff.

95.

See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.

96. As James Fry has pointed out, the "view of precedent as a binary, all-or-nothing
phenomenon" is reductive. James D. Fry, Regularity through Reason: A Foundation of
Virtue/or InternationalArbitration, 4 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 57, 61 (2011).
97.

811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987).

98.

Id. at 1123.

99. Id. See also, e.g., State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("Stare decisis reflects
a policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right ....
It is the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); c. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 577 (2003) ("The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the
judgments of the Courts and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable
command.") (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 864 (1992) ("[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and
above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.") (citations omitted).
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The Seventh Circuit observed that the district court was right in paying close attention to the earlier case, but held that the court failed to
"discharge its judicial responsibilities" by merely citing the other
court's decision without providing independent analysis. 100 The Seventh Circuit stated that "district judges in this circuit must not treat
decisions by other districtjudges, in this and a fortiori in other circuits, as controlling ....Such decisions will normally be entitled to
no more weight than their intrinsic persuasiveness merits." 101 District court decisions, in other words, are to be given no deference.
The Seventh Circuit contrasted the status of district court decisions with that of decisions from sister appellate courts. The court
held that the latter, while not binding, are entitled to some presumptive deference: "[W]e give most respectful consideration to the decisions of the other courts of appeals and follow them whenever we
can. Our district court judges should, of course, do likewise with regards to such decisions ....,,102 The reason, according to the court,
lies in the appellate courts' role in maintaining uniformity of law:
The reasons we gave for giving some though not controlling weight to decisions of other federal courts of
appeals do not apply to decisions of other district
courts, because the responsibilityfor maintaining the
law s'uniformity is a responsibility of appellate rather
than trial judges and because the Supreme Court does
100.

811F.2dat 1123 24.

101. Id. at 1124; see also Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 & n.7 (2011) ("A
decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial
district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.") (citing
18 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[1][d], at 124-26 (3d ed. 2011));
Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting
that "there is no such thing as 'the law of the district"' and that even if a case presents facts
that are identical to those in a case decided by another judge in the same district, "the prior
,resolution of those claims does not bar reconsideration by this Court of similar contentions.

The doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the decision
of another."') (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit allowed, however, that district courts
might give some deference to other district court opinions "[w]here different outcomes
would place the defendant under inconsistent legal duties .... 811 F.2d at 1124. Note that

this is a more stringent criterion than inconsistency. The conflicting awards regarding
Argentina's necessity defense, for example, do not place Argentina in a situation in which it
cannot comply with all awards as it could pay the damages it has been ordered to pay. But
see TMF Tool Co., Inc. v. Muller, 913 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) ("For a variety of

quite valid reasons, including consistency of result, it is an entirely proper practice for
district judges to give deference to persuasive opinions by their colleagues on the same
court.").
102.

811 F.2dat 1123.
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not assume the burden of resolving conflicts between
district judges whether in the same or different circuits. 103
The role of the appellate courts in harmonizing substantive
law is, therefore, what justifies the deference (however minor) to be
accorded to decisions from sister appellate courts. Conversely, since
district courts aren't charged with the responsibility for uniformity,
their decisions are entitled to no deference. The Colby opinion, in
sum, directly links the justification for precedent to the role of the re104
spective courts in establishing uniformity of law.
2. Persuasive Authority
Several authors have argued that treating prior decisions as
persuasive authority could result in a more coherent body of investment law. 105 Indeed, some have observed that a practice of persuasive authority is already taking form in investor-state arbitration, a
development that is often applauded. 106
That persuasive authority can contribute to consistent adjudication is not self-evident. As Frederic Schauer has pointed out, the
very notion of persuasive authority is puzzling. After all, "the characteristic feature of authority is its content-independence. The force

103.

Id. at 1124 (emphasis added).

104. The arguments that consistent adjudication serves continuity in law development,
and that it promotes predictability, are addressed in/ra in Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3.
105.

See, e.g., Vadi, supra note 28, at 5 15.

106. See, e.g., Bjorklund, Emerging Civilization, supra note 15, at 1273
("Notwithstanding the general rule in public international law that case law has no
precedential value, arbitral awards are increasingly used as persuasive authority both by
advocates and by tribunals."); Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty
Arbitration:A Citation Analysis o/a DevelopingJurisprudence, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 129, 14354 (analyzing citations to earlier awards and decisions in investment treaty arbitration);
Schill, supra note 20, at 82-85 (analyzing arbitral precedent); Alec Stone Sweet, InvestorState Arbitration: Proportionality'sNew Frontier,4 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTs 47, 61 (2010)
("It is today indisputable that 'a de facto doctrine of precedent' governs investor-State
arbitration: the parties intensively argue the substance and relevance of prior ICSID rulings,
which Tribunals accept as persuasive authority, and then cite as supportive justification for
their own rulings."). James Fry provides a useful categorization of the different ways in
which tribunals have dealt with pertinent past awards. See Fry, supra note 96, at 63-77; see
also Andrds Rigo Sureda, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 830,

833 39 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (describing different approaches to precedent
taken by tribunals).
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of an authoritative directive comes not from its content, but from its
source." 107 Yet the term "persuasive" indicates that an adjudicator
needs to follow non-binding decisions only if she is convinced by the
strength of their reasoning. In other words, persuasive authority has
the potential to persuade. It is, however, optional in the sense that it
does not constrain the decision-making freedom of adjudicators.
This observation naturally leads to the question of whether persuasive authority is an oxymoron. 108
On closer examination, however, the existence of relevant decisions may plausibly influence decision-making even when an adjudicator is not operating under any formal constraints. As illustrated
by the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the deference due to decisions
from sister appellate courts in Colby, one explanation for according
deference to non-binding decisions lies in uniformity. In practice, a
consistency norm leads to a presumption, however slight, in favor of
following earlier decisions. Those who wish to introduce a more robust norm of horizontal precedent into investment arbitration may argue, with some force, that horizontal deference is needed precisely to
compensate for the absence of a centralized appeals facility that
could create and enforce harmonized interpretation of the law. 109
Another reason for giving weight to non-binding authority is
expertise. 1 10 In the United States, this phenomenon is demonstrated
by the guiding role of the Delaware courts on the development of
corporate law in virtually all other states. Needless to say, decisions
from the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court that interpret the Delaware General Corporation Law have no
precedential value for cases involving the application of the corporate
statute of, say, New York State. Yet in interpreting provisions in
corporate statutes of other states, state and federal courts frequently
cite decisions from the Delaware state courts. In so doing, they often
explain that while those decisions are not binding, they are "instructive," sometimes noting the expertise of the Delaware courts in corporate law. 111 An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is that it

107. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. Riv. 1931, 1935 (2008)
[hereinafter Schauer, Authority].
108.

Id. at 1940-52.

109. Cf Cheng, supra note 84, at 1044 ("Strong internal controls appear to compensate
for the lack of external appellate controls on arbitral tribunals.").
110.

Schauer, Authority, supra note 107, at 1948 49.

111. See, e.g., Ficus Invs., Inc. v. Private Capital Mgmt., 872 N.Y.S.2d 93, 99 (Sup. Ct.
2009) ("Delaware courts have had ample opportunity to address these issues . . . and,
although not binding as to either Florida or New York law, their holdings can be
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blurs the distinction between the substantive persuasiveness of a decision and the authoritativeness of its source. The quality of the reasoning in opinions from a specialized judiciary has undoubtedly contributed to the defacto authority of the Delaware courts in the field of
corporate law. Once that authority is established, however, the fact
that a decision hails from a Delaware court gives it weight independent of its substantive merits.
Advocates for persuasive authority in investment arbitration
could point to similarities between the Delaware example and the situation in investment arbitration. Like investment arbitrators, judges
who refer to Delaware decisions when interpreting the laws of other
states are often interpreting provisions that are not identical and that
were enacted by different legislatures and at different times. Yet in
investment arbitration, there is no systemic reason to believe that any
one tribunal has greater expertise than others. Thus, although one
might expect that arbitrators naturally view each other as experts,
there is no principled reason for adopting a deferential attitude toward past decisions. At the same time, however, it is likely that certain awards will carry more weight in the minds of later arbitrators
due to the experience, expertise or reputation of the individual tribunal members.
Lastly, informal pressures may lead adjudicators to accord
some degree of deference to non-binding decisions. Among other
things, relevant decisions that are on their face well-reasoned are appealing to adjudicators, especially when those earlier decisions have
been met with approval. Following suit is easier and less risky than
expressing disagreement. Collegiality may also play a role, especially in the still relatively close-knit community of investment arbitrators. And even though earlier awards are not authoritative, lawyers
tend to derive comfort from the ability to cite sources, including nonbinding ones, that are in apparent agreement with their own views.
As a result of citation, those non-binding sources may effectively

instructive."); IBS Fin. Corp. v. Seidman & Assocs., 136 F.3d 940, 949 50 (3d Cir. 1998)

("When faced with novel issues of corporate law, New Jersey courts have often looked to
Delaware's rich abundance of corporate law for guidance."); Int'l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874
F.2d 1447, 1459 n.22 (11th Cir. 1989) ("We rely with confidence upon Delaware law to

construe Florida corporate law. The Florida courts have relied upon Delaware corporate law
to establish their own corporate doctrines."). See also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Adolf A. Berle,
Derivative Litigation Under Part VII of the ALl Principles of Corporate Governance: A
Review (f the Positions and Premises, C852 ALI-ABA 89, 114 (1993) (noting that
"Delaware corporate law has long been followed sometimes almost reflexively by other
American jurisdictions").
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gain authority. 112
As a descriptive matter, therefore, the distinction between adjudicators who are under an obligation to accord some deference to
earlier decisions and adjudicators who can treat them as they deem fit
is a blurry one. Persuasive authority turns out to be a continuum, rather than a concept that lends itself to categorization and quantification.
3. Development of a JurisprudenceConstante
Another proposed approach to precedent in investor-state arbitrations is based on the doctrine of jurisprudence constante under
French law. Gabrielle Kaufnann-Kohler explains that jurisprudence
constante attaches a stare decisis effect to lines of cases, rather than
to individual decisions. When a consistent line of cases exists, adjudicators should follow them, unless there are "compelling reasons"
to justify departure. 113 Jurisprudenceconstante is weaker than persuasive precedent in that any precedential force only takes effect
when there is a line of consistent decisions. It is more rigid, however, in that once a line of cases is established, the doctrine imposes a
strong presumption in favor of consistency. By demanding "compelling reasons" to justify departure from settled rules, jurisprudence
constante places a significant decisional burden on adjudicators.
Andrea Bjorklund has pointed to several reasons why jurisprudence constante is a compelling model for investor-state arbitration. She explains that the doctrine gives primacy to the text of the
code, but also recognizes that the meaning of code provisions is
shaped through interpretation in concrete cases. 114 Jurisprudence
112. See Schauer, Authority, supra note 107, at 1949 52.
113. Kaufmann-Kohler, Consistency, supra note 27, at 146-47; see also Charles N.
Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 474 (2009) (predicting that "the
passage of time bringing with it a continuous stream of investment jurisprudence, a
refinement of state practice and treaty making, and growing doctrinal analysis-may help
create a better understanding of the content and scope of the central principles of investment
protection and result in the creation of a jurisprudence constante"); Thomas Wilde,
Confidential Awards as Precedent in Arbitration: Dynamics and Implication of Award
Publication, in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 115 (Yas Banifatemi ed.,
2008) (arguing that "cumulative arbitral jurisprudence in the field of investment arbitration
could be said to crystallize into 'settled jurisprudence"').
114. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence
Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE
265, 272-73 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008).
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constante leaves an opening for adjudicators to deviate from earlier
awards if the text of the code does not appear to support the interpretation. Another appealing feature of the doctrine is that it does not
place too much power in the hands of a single adjudicator or panel,
since it attaches precedential value only to consistent lines of cases. 115 Essentially, it provides at least a partial solution to the problem
of arbitrariness that results from according deference to an earlier decision for no other reason than that it came first. This is an important
consideration in investor-state arbitration, which is decentralized and
does not have the safeguards associated with hierarchical adjudication.
C. Arbitratorson Precedentand Consistency
At times, language regarding a perceived need for coherence
has entered arbitral awards. For example, the annulment committee
in the Enron case posited that tribunals ought to strive for consistency, contrasting this responsibility with the more limited role of annulment committees:
[T]he role of an ad hoc committee is a limited one, restricted to assessing the legitimacy of the award and
not its correctness .... The annulment mechanism is
not designed to bring about consistency in the interpretation and application of international investment
law. The responsibilityfor ensuring consistency in the
jurisprudenceand for building a coherent body of law
rests primarily with the investment tribunals. They
are assisted in their task by the development of a
common legal opinion and the progressive emergence
16
of " une jurisprudenceconstante." 1
Recently, the question of whether earlier decisions should
constrain decision-making led to a split within a single tribunal in
Impregilo SpA v. Argentine Republic. 117 The disagreement centered
on the tribunal's jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The Argentina-Italy

115. Id.; see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Promise and Peril of Arbitral Precedent:
The Case qIAmici Curiae, in ASA Special Series No. 34, 165, 167 (Anne K. Hoffmann ed.,
2010) [hereinafter Bjorklund, Promise and Peril] ("Assigning too great a role to any one
decision could lead to the establishment of a norm that would soon be viewed as
undesirable.").
116.

Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 30, ]65 (emphasis added).

117. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/ 17, Award (June
21, 2011), 1 99.
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BIT, which was invoked by the claimant, provides that arbitration is
open to investors only after they have pursued a dispute in the Argentine courts for eighteen months. 118 The BIT also includes a so-called
"most favored nation" (MFN) clause, under which the treaty-makers
commit to treat covered investments no less favorably than investments by investors from third states. 119 Effectively, this means that
investors can invoke stronger protections granted in other BITs. The
question before the Impregilo tribunal was whether the MFN clause
in the Argentina-Italy BIT extends to its dispute resolution clause.
The majority of the tribunal held that it does, allowing the claimant
investor to rely on the dispute resolution provision from the Argentina-United States BIT, under which investors could immediately resort to arbitration. In justifying its conclusion, the majority referenced its analysis of earlier awards on the issue:
It is true that ...

the jurisprudence regarding the ap-

plication of MFN clauses to dispute settlement provisions is not fully consistent. Nevertheless, in cases
where the MFN clause has referred to "all matters" or
"any matter" regulated in the BIT, there has been
near-unanimity in finding that the clause covered the
dispute settlement rules. On this basis, the majority of
the Tribunal reaches the conclusion that Impregilo is
entitled to rely, in this respect, on the dispute settlement rules of the Argentina-[United States] BIT and
that the case cannot be dismissed for non-observance
of the requirements20in Article 8(2) and (3) of the Argentina-Italy BIT. 1
In her dissenting opinion, tribunal member Brigitte Stem expressed strong disagreement with the ruling on jurisdiction, warning
of the "great dangers" of allowing claimants to circumvent jurisdictional requirements by invoking MFN clauses. 12 1 Stem also criticized the majority's reliance on earlier awards. She pointed out that
the appearance of broad consensus was deceptive because many arbitrators served on more than one tribunal. 122 She then stated that "[i]n
any case, it does not appear to me to be a legally convincing argu-

118.

Id. 1 12 (discussing Article 8.3 of the BIT between Argentina and Italy).

119.

Id.

101.

120.

Id.

108 (emphasis added).

121. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion, 7199 (Stern, June 21, 2011).
122.

Id. 115.
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ment to rely on former cases as if they were binding precedents." 123
Stem's accusation that the majority treated other decisions as
binding precedents may not be entirely fair, but it is clear that the majority attached at least some weight to earlier awards, and gave consideration to consistency. The majority position, as we have seen,
has found strong support in the academic literature. In the next Part,
I will argue that this literature overlooks the significant costs of consistency. 124
III.

THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CONSISTENCY

The argument for precedent in investor-state arbitration is
premised on a notion that greater consistency is something worth
striving for. 125 In fact, the desirability of consistent adjudication is
rarely questioned, even by those who do not come out in favor of
precedent. 126
In this Part, I first scrutinize the goals served by consistent adjudication: equal treatment of litigants, continuity, predictability and
legitimacy. The justifications for privileging these goals, as I will
explain, are diminished in the context of investment arbitration. I
next argue that a consistency criterion, by demanding that adjudicators deviate from their best professional judgment of what the law requires, interferes with other adjudication values. I conclude that investment arbitration is better served by abandoning consistency as a
goal and focusing instead on accuracy, sincerity and transparency in
decision-making.

123.

Id.

124. 1 should note that it is unclear whether Stem would agree with my conclusion in
Part III that arbitrators should give no deference to earlier awards. Her criticism that the
majority treated earlier awards as binding precedents leaves open whether she would support
weaker forms of precedent. Similarly, her observation that the basis for finding unity was
weak leaves open whether she would attach some value to genuine consensus.
125. Kaufinann-Kohler, Consistency, supra note 27, at 147 ("Consistency is not a myth.
Consistency is a reality and a necessary objective at the same time."); Kim, supra note 23, at
257 58 (identifying coherence and consistency as key factors for enhancing legitimacy of
investment arbitration).
126. See, e.g., Fry, supra note 96, at 60 ("To be clear, this Article squarely fits within
the international effort to bring unity to an otherwise fragmented investment treaty regime
....
.).
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A. Goals Promoted by Consistency
Although some have argued that consistent adjudication is inherently valuable, the strongest explanations for stare decisis in court
systems are consequentialist, i.e., based on external values that are
127
served by consistency.
1. Equality
The notion that consistency in adjudication is desirable for its
own sake is expressed most strongly in the maxim that like cases
ought to be treated alike. 128 Although the argument from equality
appeals to our sense of fairness, its practical application is far from
straightforward. For one, whether two cases are identical can only be
determined by reference to the rule that is being applied. Consider,
for example, a rule stating that a government may not expropriate
private property without adequate compensation. Equal treatment
means that any claimant whose property is expropriated is entitled to
adequate compensation. Yet we cannot determine whether two
claimants are identically situated without resorting to the criteria for
expropriation. Peter Westen has for these reasons argued that equality is tautological and an empty value, a position that has sparked extensive academic debate. 129
This issue could be overcome by reframing the appropriate
inquiry as follows: once a decision-maker acknowledges that a case
is identical to an earlier one in all relevant respects, should the two
cases receive equal treatment? 130 Should there, perhaps, be a pre127. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, integrity, and
Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2037 (1996). But see Amanda Frost,
Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1581 (2008) (arguing that in the U.S. court
system, "eradicating nonunifonnity has too often been given priority at the expense of other
values").
128. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 1585; Franck, Investor Rights, supra
note 20, at 65 66.
129. See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 185-225 (1990); Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542-48 (1982); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
In Del nse of Equality: A Reply to PrqessorWesten, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Anthony
D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983); Kent
Greenawalt, PrescriptiveEquality: Two Steps Forlvard,110 HARV. L. REV. 1265, (1997).
130. Cf Earl Maltz, The Nature (f Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 369 (1988)
("Virtually all would agree that two incidents adjudicated by the same court, occurring in
the same place and at the same time, and arising out of facts which are identical except for
the identity of the litigants, should be treated equally.").
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sumption of equality? An objection to a rule of equal treatment under
this second formulation is that it may lead to the perpetuation of rules
that have come to be viewed as harmful. 131 As Larry Alexander has
explained: "Neither two nor two million wrongs can make a right,
however much they equalize situations. Nor is the two millionth
wrong somehow less wrong than the first." 132 Alexander also points
out that, if one takes equality seriously, the case for equal-but
wrong-treatment is stronger in cases in which the error is more serious. The reason is that in those cases, the inequality between litigants whose cases were resolved before and after a "wrong" line of
decisions was corrected would be more significant. 133 The logical
corollary of these arguments, however, suggests that an equality criterion also has the desirable effect of protecting beneficial legal rules
34
and principles from the whims of individual decision-makers. 1
In some circumstances, the case for equal treatment may be
stronger, even in an arbitration context. Imagine that, instead of letting dozens of arbitrations run their course, Argentina and a significant number of investor claimants had agreed to set up a designated
tribunal tasked with the resolution of BIT claims by foreign investors
relating to specific government measures taken during a defined period of time. 135 In such a scenario, consistency would be critical. In
part, this is because of the discrete character of the mandate. The tribunal would handle a limited docket of cases concerning state action
that took place in a limited timeframe in the past. The task of such a
tribunal is to achieve just and fair resolution of cases that are brought
131. Alexander, supra note 6, at 10 ("To take an extreme example, if most members of
a particular group of people have been subjected to grossly unjust treatment-say, slavery or
genocide-seeing that the rest of the members are subjected to the same treatment is no less
wrong despite its furtherance of 'equality."'); see also Peters, supra note 127, at 2068
("Equality is sequentially arbitrary: It makes the rightness or wrongness of a person's
treatment contingent on the sequence in which that person is treated with respect to other
identically situated people.").
132.

Alexander, supra note 6, at 11.

133.

Id.

134. See Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule o1Law: A Layered Approach, 111
MIcH. L. REv. 1, 8 (2012) ("Just as it has the power to entrench erroneous decisions against
later correction, so stare decisis also has the power to entrench correct decisions against later
temptations and deviations."); see also Peters, supra note 127, at 2034.
135. The paradigmatic example of a mass claims settlement process is the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, which was established in 1981. For a discussion of some of the
characteristics of the Tribunal and its significance for the development of international
dispute resolution, see David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal and the Evolving Structure oflInternationalDispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
104 (1990).
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together in a single forum precisely because of their common features. In addition, the institutional nature of a standing tribunal creates justified expectations of continuity.
Those features are, of course, not present in the current investment arbitration framework. It is rare to encounter a cluster of
cases, like the Argentina claims. Overall, the field is characterized
by almost endless variety. At this time there are over three thousand
BITs, each negotiated between different sovereigns and under varying circumstances. Nor are investment arbitrators dealing with a
fixed docket. And although there have been calls for the creation of a
permanent appeals facility, institutional continuity is lacking under
the current framework, in which tribunals are appointed in accordance with the parties' agreement. In light of the characteristics of investment law and the defining features of arbitration, it is perhaps unsurprising that equal treatment of litigants has not featured
prominently in the case for consistency in investment arbitration.
2. Continuity
The argument for consistency is closely associated with a
stance on how adjudicators should handle the discretion that flows
from the indeterminacy of legal norms. Adjudicative lawmaking involves the balancing of two values: the promotion of uniformity in
the application of law, and the adaptation of an existing body of sub36
stantive law to meet new situations and changing circumstances. 1
These goals coexist in an uneasy tension. True uniformity requires
strict adherence to earlier decisions, while the adaptation rationale
mandates that, when the situation calls for it, earlier decisions be bent
or even overruled. 137 The uniformity mandate is therefore never absolute. Rather than demanding a slavish following of earlier decisions, it calls for a certain amount of coherence. As a result, the law

136. David Frisch, Contractual Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of
Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REv. 57, 74-76 (2003); c. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL.,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-3 (1976).
137. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function otReview and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 554 (1969) ("The
lawmaking role requires a delicate balance between the importance of flexibility in the
national law and the importance of stability of doctrine."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability
and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 423 (1988) ("Th[e]
possibility of improvement makes precedent unstable .... There is an equilibrium degree of
disequilibrium."); Schauer, Precedent,supra note 8, at 597 ("We attain predictability ...
only by diminishing our ability to adapt to a changing future.").
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still evolves, but the mode of change is an incremental one. 138
The perceived need for more controlled lawmaking takes center stage in the calls for consistency in investment arbitration. 139 Indeed, commentators tend to cite impediments to the development of
140
coherent legal standards as the main reason for proposed reforms.
The implementation of an incremental change model into investment
arbitration is challenging due to the absence of a central appeals facility that could impose its earlier interpretations through the threat of
reversal. But the lack of a hierarchical structure does not have to be
dispositive. If consistency is desirable, one could argue, the responsibility of investment tribunals in maintaining uniformity is greater
than that of the lower courts in a hierarchical court system. The lack
of formal enforcement might be offset to some extent through informal mechanisms, including reputational consequences.
A more fundamental question is whether incremental change
is an appropriate model for lawmaking in a dynamic and relatively
young field. Perhaps what is called for is a more flexible notion of
law development, with a significant role for dialogue among tribunals
as well as between tribunals and members of the legal academy. In
some areas, consensus may naturally come about as a result of overwhelming agreement among arbitrators. In fact, this is already happening, although it is not clear whether any such concensus is due to
widespread agreement, or because arbitrators feel constrained to follow earlier awards. Based on an examination of investment awards,
Gabrielle Kaufnann-Kohler has concluded that case law addressing,
respectively, the distinction between treaty and contract claims and
the fair and equitable treatment standard is already remarkably consistent. 14 1 Yet, although the emergence of common standards is one
possible outcome of a dialectical process, the premise of such a process is that arbitrators do not strive for consistency. On more controversial questions, such as those involving the application of the necessity defense, tribunals will likely remain divided. 142 Multiple

138. Cf MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION 93 (2002) (noting that "the rules or practices of stare decisis [are] simply
those of incrementalism stated in other terms").
139. See, e.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 1584 87; Christoph
Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization (?f Treaty Interpretationin Investment Arbitration, 3
TRANSNAT'L DIsP. MGMT., at 17 24 (2006).
140. See, e.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 1584 87; Franck, Investor
Rights, supranote 20, at 66 67; Fry, supranote 96, at 77 84.
141.

Kaufmann-Kohler, Consistency, supra note 27, at 138-41.

142.

C . id. at 142-43.
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lines of authority may develop over time, without any perspective on
a resolution. It is even possible that some disagreements will deepen.
Until now, I have taken for granted that investment arbitrators
have a role to play in lawmaking. This notion, however, is open to
debate. In national legal systems, the development of legal standards
by judges who are not democratically elected poses issues of accountability and legitimacy. 143 Arguably, these concerns are exacerbated in the case of investment arbitration, which lacks an institutional judiciary or legislature. 144 A fuller exploration of the issue is
outside the scope of this Article. I want to point out, however, that
concerns about adjudicators usurping too much power do not necessarily counsel in favor of consistency, especially in a decentralized
dispute resolution framework like investment arbitration. 145 Quite
the contrary: such concerns provide arguments for faithfulness to the
text of a treaty and the intent of the sovereigns as it appears from the
circumstances under which the instrument was entered-in sum, interpretation methods that call for independent analysis and verification.
3. Predictability
Continuity is valued, in large part, because it renders the law
more predictable. The argument is that members of a legal community plan their lives, conduct their affairs and assess risks in reliance
on pronouncements about the law in published opinions. 146 Not only

143.

See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE

SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 23 (1962).

144.

Cf Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime, 99 AM. Soc.

INT'L L. & PROC. 94, 96 (2005) ("The emerging FDI regime draws some of the same
'democratic' critiques as more institutionalized international regimes: namely, that the law
that it relies on is not accountable or respectful of traditional notions of separation of

powers."); Bjorklund, Promise and Peril, supra note 115, at 167 ("Arbitral innovation
inevitably gives rise to questions about the democratic deficit in international judicial
lawmaking. Because there is no established system of government, no legislative branch can
reply to perceived excesses in judicial decision-making.").

145.

In the case of an institutionalized judiciary, the argument that consistency operates

to restrain "activist" judging in violation of the limits imposed on the judiciary by the

separation of powers doctrine is stronger. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and
Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286 87 (1990).
146. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Why Must lnIerior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 850 52 (1994); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 & n.12 (citing F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
157 (1960)).
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does stability of the law offer peace of mind, but it also enables actors to predict the consequences of contemplated courses of action
with greater precision. This argument is formidable, especially when
combined with the notion that in most cases, it is debatable whether
any given interpretation of the law has a stronger claim to validity
than competing interpretations.
If-as eminent judges have
acknowledged-in many cases there is no single right answer, 147 why
shouldn't justified expectations tip the scale?
These considerations have significant force in the investment
law context. Indeed, it could be said that the creation of a more stable climate for investors is the very objective of investment treaties. 148 Inconsistent decisions undermine this goal. 14 9 Sovereigns
similarly have an interest in stability, as it helps assess the likelihood
that contemplated courses of action will result in liability. Moreover,
in their capacity of treaty-makers involved in the negotiation and
drafting of new treaties, they take interpretations of common treaty
terms by arbitrators into account. 150 It therefore makes sense that arbitral tribunals have invoked predictability as a reason for giving
weight to earlier awards. Consider, for example, the following passage from a decision on jurisdiction by an ICSID tribunal in Saipem
147. See, e.g., Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Crqfi of Judging, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) ("[M]any a complicated case is like a jigsaw puzzle with multiple
solutions, often as to reasoning and sometimes as to outcome, none being inevitable."); Jon
0. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 630 (1992)
("Reasonable judges will inevitably come out differently on close questions of law. The
hierarchical structure of a judicial system requires that even a well-reasoned view of a trial
judge will be displaced by the well-reasoned view of a panel of appellate judges."); see also
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks"on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 (1950).
148. Empirical studies, however, have cast doubt on the assumption that investment
treaties result in larger flows of foreign investment. M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis:
Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note
18, at 39, 39 & n.1.
149. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 1584; see also Andreas Bucher, Is
There a Need to Establish a Permanent Reviewing Body?, in THE REVIEW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARDS 285, 285 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2008) (noting that
the lack of consistency in investment arbitration awards creates "uncertainty" and "has a
negative impact on the authority that the ICSID system should command"); THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 52 (1990) (identifying "determinacy"
and "coherence" as two of four indicators of rule legitimacy); Johanna Kalb, Creating an
ICSID Appellate Body, UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179, 196 200 (2005) (arguing that
inconsistent arbitration awards undermine international investment).
150. Cf Cheng, supra note 84, at 1025 ("Awards may have a constitutive effect on
international investment law if third-party observers adjust their strategies in anticipation
that future similar disputes will lead to similar outcomes.").
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v. Bangladesh:
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion
that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions
of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to
compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt
solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It
also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given
treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it
has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the
legitimate expectations of the community of States and
investors towards certainty of the rule of law. 151
Yet given the characteristics of international investment law,
any reliance on past awards rests on a fragile basis. Predictability is
already limited in light of the fragmented nature of the sources of
law, the indeterminacy of the terms used in investment treaties and
the characteristics of dispute resolution by arbitrators who bring a diversity of legal backgrounds and expertise to the process. 152 Moreover, to some extent the lack of systemic predictability is mitigated by
the parties' influence on the constitution of the arbitral tribunal that is
to decide their specific dispute. The default rule in ICSID arbitrations is that a tribunal consists of two party-appointed arbitrators and
a chair who is "appointed by agreement of the parties." 153 Of
course, the power this appointment method affords to each party is
offset to a large extent by the circumstance that the other party enjoys
the same amount of control. In addition, due to the uncertainties inherent in judging, even the most experienced counsel cannot predict
the dynamics of a given tribunal with complete confidence. But the
party control over the appointment removes some of the uncertainties
that come with the random assignment of judges in court systems,
and it reduces the risk of appointing an "outlier" tribunal.
151.

Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's

Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No.

ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures 67
(Mar. 21, 2007) (emphases added), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org; see also
Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent,supra note 28, at 374 ("It may be debatable whether
arbitrators have a legal obligation to follow precedents-probably not-but it seems well
settled that they have a moral obligation to follow precedents so as to foster a normative

environment that is predictable.").
152. Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 164 (2008)
("Reliance does not justify precedent-following, but . . . emerges out of the fact that
precedent-following is already the norm.").

153.

ICSID Convention, supranote 22, art. 37(2)(b).
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4. Legitimacy
Consistency is often said to promote the legitimacy of adjudication and increases the authority of the decision-makers. 154 Consistent adjudication, in this view, contributes to a perception that legal decision-makers decide in accordance with rules rather than
arbitrary criteria. 155 This, in turn, renders judgments more acceptable
to parties who do not prevail. Although the argument may seem to
be concerned primarily with the appearanceof justice, many adjudicators have internalized this notion of legitimacy. 156
In the United States, much of the debate about stare decisis
has focused on the need to restrain the discretion of unelected judges
to make determinations about the constitutionality of laws enacted by
democratically elected legislatures. The legitimacy of courts, and especially the Supreme Court, is most clearly at stake in constitutional
challenges to legislation concerning politically controversial issues.
The plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey expressly
notes the connection between consistency and legitimacy:
[O]verruling Roe's central holding would... seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial
power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law .... The Court must
take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to
accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as
such, no bearing on the principled choices that the

154. Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA 's Investment Chapter, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 51 (2003) ("[l]nternational regimes depend for their survival on
perceptions of legitimacy ....
To generate perceptions of legitimacy, legal regimes must
operate predictably, conform to historical practice, and incorporate fundamental values
shared by the governed community.").
155. This observation holds true most strongly for the highest courts, especially in the
area of constitutional law.
See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 723, 753 (1988) ("[T]he Court's
institutional position would be weakened were it generally perceived that the Court itself
views its own decisions as little more than 'a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and
train only."') (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)).
Although the argument appears to apply to adjudication in general, the federal court system
of the United States tolerates a great deal of inconsistency among the district courts. See
infra Part II.B.2.
156.

See Maltz, supra note 130, at 371.
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Court is obliged to make. 157
The notion that inconsistent adjudication undermines the legitimacy of the investment regime is at the heart of proposals intended to increase consistency in investor-state arbitrations. Indeed, such
proposals have often been accompanied by the observation that investment arbitration is-or soon will be-in a "legitimacy crisis." 158
But legitimacy takes a different form in arbitration than it does in legal systems with institutionalized adjudicatory bodies. Concepts of
legitimacy from court systems cannot simply be transposed into a
dispute resolution system that is grounded in consent.
In sum, the primary justifications for consistent adjudication
are premised on the existence of relatively stable norms. It is not impossible to try to develop investment law into something that more
closely resembles a "system," but this approach is in tension with the
dynamic and fragmented nature of the field. The selection of a dispute resolution method that has an ad hoc character also weakens the
case for privileging consistency.
B. Consistency and Decision-Making
Having evaluated the goals served by consistency in adjudication, I will now address whether investment arbitrators should give
some weight to consistency along with other considerations. In this
Part, I identify an inherent conflict between consistency and accuracy, sincerity and transparency. While a consistency norm would
reign in some idiosyncratic decision-making, on balance, international investment law is better served by not placing further limits on the
autonomy of arbitrators.

157.

505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).

158. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 16, at 1586; Somarajah, supra note 148, at
41-42 (arguing that a legitimacy crisis has arisen as a result of the exploding number of
arbitrations, coupled with the absence of a control mechanism and the fact that most
arbitrators come from commercial arbitration backgrounds and may not be as sensitive to the
public nature of the interests involved). See also Brower 1i, supra note 154, at 93
(concluding that the investment chapter of NAFTA "finds itself in the midst of a legitimacy
crisis," in part as a result of incoherent decisions from ad hoc tribunals); but see Krishan,
supra note 11, at 110-16 (arguing that the term "legitimacy crisis" is distorting and perverts
the discussion as there is no legitimacy crisis in investment arbitration and none is looming);
Paulsson, Unintended Consequences, supra note 29, at 241 ("What issues of coherence?

....

From a practitioner's viewpoint, there is no crisis of unpredictability.").
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1. Accuracy
Consistency is value neutral, in the sense that it is concerned
only with the equality of outcomes, not with their merits. One consequence of this characteristic is that consistency appears to provide
an objective criterion for the resolution of questions as to which deep
disagreement exists. Some of the considerations that support continuity in law development also favor using consistency as a proxy for
measuring the "correctness" of individual opinions. Put simply:
when reasonable jurists disagree about what the law requires, promoting stability and honoring expectations is a defensible policy
choice.
The case for consistency is closely linked to an institutional
conception of adjudication. In this conception-sometimes identified
as a feature of the "rule of law"-judges decide not as individual adjudicators, but rather as members of an institution (the "judiciary") 15 9 Even a weak form of precedent helps reinforce this institutional framework. The "correctness" of a decision, under this view,
is determined by the extent to which it is connected to the cases that
precede and follow it. The image that comes to mind is Ronald
Dworkin's analogy of judges to authors of a chain novel. 160 This notion is strongly associated with the common law system, in which
judges have traditionally played a prominent part in the development
161
of substantive law.
What gets lost in this notion of "correctness," however, is the
adjudicator's independent judgment about the "right" interpretation
or application of the law. Practically speaking, any constraints im-

159. Waldron, supra note 134, at 17 (the rule of law requires that ajudge "is to think of
herself as deciding in the name of the whole society, not in her own name; not only that, but
she is deciding as a court, as part of the judiciary").
160. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, 225 75 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, How Law Is
Like Literature, in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 66 (1985). As Jeremy
Waldron has pointed out, however, Dworkin's "law as integrity" is an account of
interpretation, not of stare decisis or precedent (although some form of the latter may be
implicit in his model). Waldron, supra note 134, at 17 & n.50.
161. In practice, lower court judges in civil law systems often follow the reasoning of
higher courts to avoid reversal. See, e.g., Olav A. Haazen, Precedent in the Netherlands, in
PRECEDENT AND THE LAW 227, 235-36 (Ewoud Hondius ed., 2007); Robert Alexy & Ralf
Dreier, Precedentin the FederalRepublic of Germany, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 17, 36
(D. Neil MacConnick & Robert S. Summers, eds., 1997); see also Raj Bhala, The Myth
About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (PartOne of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 845, 910 15 (1999) (citing sources for the proposition that, in practice, French
courts overwhelmingly follow decisions from higher courts).
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posed by a consistency criterion are not felt when earlier decisions
overwhelmingly support the position an adjudicator would have
reached independently. Precedent begins to matter, rather, when a
decision-maker considers two or more outcomes that she believes are
equally correct. At that juncture, following earlier decisions is perhaps no more troubling than flipping a coin. But the real test of the
role of consistency and precedent comes when earlier cases are in
conflict with the adjudicator's opinion regarding the "right" interpretation or application of the law. A decision to follow earlier case law
in spite of this conflict, therefore, deprives the parties and the legal
community of an adjudicator's view of what the law requires. 162
In investor-state arbitration, this sacrifice is problematic. As
discussed earlier, international law does not confer the status of law
on adjudicatory decisions. 163 Setting these formalistic arguments
aside, there are compelling policy reasons to favor autonomy over
consistency. As for the investment community as a whole, greater
autonomy may over time result in better answers. Eventually, such
answers may have a shot at attracting genuine consensus, as opposed
to one that is the result of constraints imposed by precedent. This
possibility is suggested by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which explains that (i) if we assume that each voter has a more than even
chance of being right, and (ii) decisions are made by majority vote,
an increase of the number of voters will translate into a greater likelihood of arriving at the right answer.164 Under this theory, arbitral
tribunals consisting of three arbitrators have a good chance at getting
to the right answer because it is unlikely that outlier positions would
obtain a majority of the votes-an effect that compounds over
time. 165 Paradoxically, the Condorcet Jury Theorem suggests that in162. Although such a view is, in a sense, necessarily subjective, this should not be
equated with "arbitrary" or "free from constraints." Rather, I use the term here in the sense
of the professional judgment of an adjudicator. Cf Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity,
94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1013 (2008) (noting that "[judges'] perspectives are subjective in the
sense that they may think their reasons provide sound justifications, even if that is, in fact,
not the case").
163.

See supra Part ILA.

164. Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQ.
L. 87, 88 89 (2002).
165. Note that this theory would also provide an argument for independent voting on
tribunals, as opposed to joint deliberation. The reason is that in collegial adjudication, the

decisionmaking process is affected some would say distorted by joint deliberation,
compromises and incentives for strategic voting. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser &
Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 51, 56 (1993) (discussing reasons for strategic voting on multi-member courts); Evan
H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L.
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dividual tribunals should be reluctant to reject interpretations that enjoy widespread acceptance. If sixty tribunals have considered an issue and all of them came out the same way, those tribunals are likely
right. Yet the very assumptions that underlie the significance we attach to the apparent consensus among sixty tribunals also demands
that we grant each tribunal complete freedom to arrive at the "right"
decision. After all, these numbers are meaningful only if each tribunal reached its decision without feeling any pressure to close ranks.
A consistency norm is also problematic from the perspective
of the parties to a particular dispute. Those who advocate the implementation of precedent into investment treaty arbitration effectively
ask that arbitrators in investor-state disputes conceive of themselves
as taking part in a joint endeavor similar to the way judges do. The
typical features of arbitration, however, render it at odds with a notion of institutionalized adjudication. The consensual nature of arbitration extends to the appointment of the tribunal. Arbitrators are appointed in accordance with the parties' agreement. In most cases
parties have a strong say in the constitution of the tribunal: directly
through the party-appointed arbitrators, and indirectly through the influence they have on the appointment of a chair. 166 For better or
worse, parties expend significant resources in trying to identify arbi167
trators whom they believe will be sympathetic to their position.
Parties, in other words, entrust their dispute to a tribunal composed of
specific individuals who were appointed in accordance with their
agreement. Presumably, the parties to an arbitration wish to have
their dispute decided by the arbitrators they selected, not-albeit indirectly-by tribunals that were appointed in the past by other parties. In this setting, there are compelling reasons to place a strong
value on the independent judgment of the tribunal appointed pursuant
to the parties' agreement, as opposed to the collective wisdom of tribunals that have decided similar disputes in the past.

REV. 2297, 2312 33 (detailing opportunities and incentives for strategic conduct).
166.

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

167. Doak Bishop and Lucy Reed sum up the conventional wisdom in noting that most
parties adhere to the view that "'their' arbitrators can be generally predisposed to them
personally or to their positions, as long as they can ultimately decide the case without
partiality-in favour of the party with the better case." R. Doak Bishop & Lucy F. Reed,
Practical Guidelines Jbr Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-appointed
Arbitratorsin InternationalCommercialArbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 395, 396 (1998).
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2. Sincerity
Sincerity is susceptible to different meanings, but at its core is
a notion of truthfulness. Micah Schwartzman, for example, defines
sincerity as "correspondence between what people say, what they intend to say, and what they believe." 168 In the context of judging, sincerity is closely associated with the communication of reasons by adjudicators. Sincerity in adjudicatory reason-giving can take two
forms. It may refer to correspondence between the reasons that motivated the decision-maker and the reasons communicated to justify
the decision. But it may also refer to a requirement that the decisionmaker provide reasons that she believes justify the outcome. A crucial difference between the two forms is that the second form does
not require that the decision-maker is actually motivated by those
reasons, only that she believes they are legally sufficient. Mathilde
Cohen has termed these two forms, respectively, the "internalist"
and "externalist" readings of sincerity. 169 A requirement that an adjudicator consider consistency as a factor in decision-making will often interfere with sincerity.
To understand the interplay between consistency and sincerity, it is useful to place ourselves in the position of a tribunal of three
arbitrators who conclude that a line of earlier awards has been
wrongly decided. Take, for example, the facts of the Argentina
cases. However, let us imagine that instead of the chaos that ensued,
five tribunals decided that Argentina faced full liability for the
measures taken under the Emergency Law. All tribunals rejected
Argentina's necessity defense, holding that under the ArgentinaUnited States BIT, Argentina's crisis did not amount to a state of
emergency. Let us also imagine that any annulment proceedings
ended in rejections of the annulment applications, and that none of
the annulment decisions cast doubt on the accuracy of the awards.
The tribunal tasked with deciding the sixth case brought by a U.S. in-

168.

Schwartzman, supranote 162, at 992.

169. Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers
Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1097 98 (2010). These concepts correspond largely with
two principles of legitimacy of adjudication introduced by Schwartzman. Schwartzman's
principle of legal justification appears to be aimed at externalist sincerity: "Adjudication is
legitimate only if (i) judge J has sufficient reason R to justify legal decision D, and (ii)
makes R known to those governed by D." And his principle of judicial sincerity seems to
require internalist sincerity: "Adjudication is legitimate only if (i) J believes that R is
sufficient to justify D, and (ii) makes R known to those governed by D." Schwartzman,
supra note 162, at 1014. Notably, Cohen extends the notion of sincerity from adjudication
to a broader context that includes all state actors. Cohen, supra, at 1095-96.
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vestor against Argentina concludes, however, that the right result is
for Argentina to be exempted from liability to the investor under the
necessity defense. Specifically, the members of this tribunal believe
that the earlier decisions were based on a wrong interpretation of the
relevant BIT provisions regarding the necessity defense and an incorrect assessment of the facts concerning the severity of the economic
crisis.
If the arbitrators want to maintain consistency, one course of
action would be to follow the earlier awards despite disagreeing with
them. Yet if the award simply provides the reasoning and outcome
from past awards, and fails to note that the decision was motivated by
consistency, there is no compliance with the internalist reading of
sincerity. Of course, communicating the motivating reason for the
decision in this scenario would defeat the very purpose the tribunal is
trying to achieve. To understand why, one need only imagine a decision explaining that although the tribunal believes the five earlier tribunals reached a wrong outcome based on an inaccurate interpretation of applicable law, it nonetheless follows these decisions for the
sake of consistency.
This analysis is too simple, however, if adjudicators genuinely believe they are bound by earlier decisions. In that situation, an
adjudicator's view that he needs to follow binding precedent will
trump his or her convictions regarding the best interpretation of the
law. So there would be no conflict with the internalist reading of sincerity if a panel of Second Circuit judges follows a Supreme Court
decision the judges believe was wrongly decided, because they accept that under the governing rules, the law is whatever the Supreme
Court says it is. Binding precedent, in other words, adds a meta-level
of institutional obligation to the question of sincerity. A strong norm
of horizontal precedent could play a similar role, if arbitrators were to
view themselves as constrained to accord some deference to earlier
awards. If, however, the decision to follow earlier awards is merely
prudential, the practice of following earlier awards that arbitrators believe were wrongly decided poses a conflict with the internalist reading of sincerity.
Does the adoption of the reasoning from earlier awards without noting disagreement also conflict with an externalist reading of
sincerity? This question is more difficult to answer, because "right"
and "wrong" may not be absolute categories in the minds of adjudicators. If the adjudicators believe the adopted reasoning cannot justify the decision under any reasonable reading of the law, then there is
a conflict with the externalist reading of sincerity. But if the adjudicators think the question is one of degree and discretion, and some
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answers are better than others but neither is necessarily right or
wrong, the issue is not as clear-cut. As a formal matter, they may believe that the reasons adequately support the decision, even though
subjectively speaking they think a different reasoning and outcome
would have been better. If one believes that adjudicators should
strive to reach the decision that they believe is best supported by the
law, however, there is a conflict even under the externalist reading.
Now, imagine that the same tribunal adopts a more strategic
course of action. The arbitrators would like to achieve both goals:
preserve consistency, but ensure that at least the outcome is correct in
their view. So they look for a way to distinguish the case before it
from the earlier ones. The arbitrators are aware that it is next to impossible to distinguish the case based on the facts or the law pertaining to the necessity defense, as those are essentially identical for all
the cases. Instead, they shift their attention to the contracts between
Argentina and the claimant in all six cases. There is some minor variation in the pertinent provisions, and the claimant in the sixth case
negotiated the contract a few years later than the other five claimants.
The arbitrators realize that if they can hold that Argentina did not
breach the umbrella clause, they need not reach the necessity defense,
which is premised on a breach of BIT obligations by the sovereign.
So, even though their disagreement is (primarily) with the interpretation of the necessity defense, the arbitrators dispose of the claims by
ruling that under the specific contract between Argentina and the
claimant, Argentina's measures were not in breach of the umbrella
clause.
Here, it is unclear whether there is a conflict with either reading of sincerity. For both readings, the analysis may turn on whether
the arbitrators ultimately came to believe that the distinction they
made regarding the umbrella clause was a valid one. To start with
the internalist reading: although the arbitrators may initially have
been motivated by their disagreement with the rulings of earlier tribunals on the necessity defense, their research may have genuinely
convinced them of the correctness of the position that the umbrella
clause was not breached. In that case, their award provided the reason that ultimately motivated the decision, and any mention of the
necessity defense would have amounted to dicta. If, however, the arbitrators were not genuinely convinced by the distinction they provided but decided it was an elegant way to avoid overt disagreement,
70
then the resulting award is insincere under the internalist reading. 1
170. A concept that is closely related to sincerity, but conceptually distinct, is candor.
Scholars use different definitions for candor, and some definitions overlap with sincerity.
The difference between sincerity and candor, as described by Schwartzman, is that
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Similarly, under the externalist reading the award is sincere if the arbitrators believe that the reasons regarding the umbrella clause are
sufficient to justify the distinction and the resulting difference in outcome. If, however, they believe that the distinction is immaterial, the
award is insincere.
Exploring options that may avoid inconsistency with earlier
decisions is not in and of itself problematic under either sincerity criterion. If the desire for consistency encourages arbitrators to engage
in more thorough research of issues that are pertinent for resolution
of the case, the quality of decision-making will likely improve. What
does matter, however, is the mindset with which the arbitrators approach their task. They may decide to try to find a way to resolve the
case without needlessly contradicting earlier awards, but still commit
themselves to resolving the case in accordance with what they believe to be the best interpretation of the law. Or they may adopt a
mindset that "the end justifies the means" and resolve to use whatever reasons they can marshal that will plausibly support the desired
result, regardless of whether they themselves believe that those reasons are valid.
Consistency is thus potentially in conflict with both readings
of sincerity. In centralized legal systems, the implementation of a
meta-level of sincerity that imposes an obligation to accord deference
to earlier decisions is justified by the need to promote certain systemwide goals, including coherent law development. 171 In the context of
investment arbitration, however, sacrificing sincerity is an unnecessarily high price. Although this may seem somewhat counter"sincerity merely requires intentional correspondence between belief and utterance," and
"candor demands a certain measure of affirmative disclosure on the part of the speaker."
Schwartzman, supra note 162, at 994-95. However, the scope of a candor requirement is
imprecise. One reading of judicial candor is that it requires that judges disclose information
that is sufficient so as to "not knowingly mislead others about a legal decision." Id. at 996.
This definition of candor overlaps with what Cohen has teried "externalist sincerity." See
supra note 169 and accompanying text. But candor can also refer to a thicker requirement to
disclose "all information that [a judge] believes is relevant to a legal decision."

Schwartzman, supra at 996 (emphasis added). This interpretation of candor would impose,
among other things, a requirement that judges not omit alternative reasons that they believe
have contributed to the outcome. Id. at 995-97.
171.

See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, Law, Logic and Experience, 3 How. L.J. 26, 37-38 (1957)

(noting that judging involves "the maintenance of a continuity of tradition through the
pretense that change is not change" and that judges engage in the creation of "legal
fictions" to mask lawmaking); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1392 94 (1995) (discussing the tension between sincerity and "the
demand for continuity"); Lf Schwartzman, supra note 162, at 988 89 (summarizing

objections to a strong presumption in favor of judicial sincerity).
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intuitive, if taken seriously sincerity could serve as an internal check
on adjudicators, resulting in more deliberate decision-making. Specifically, an internalist sincerity requirement could lead arbitrators to
question the rightness of their decision if they are uncomfortable
about providing the "real" reasons for the outcome. 172 Externalist
sincerity forces arbitrators to think critically about the force of their
legal arguments.
3. Transparency
The absence of a consistency constraint facilitates transparency in two respects. First, greater sincerity in opinion-writing leads to
better insight into the grounds for decisions. Of course, any information about the motivations of a tribunal is of tremendous value to
future parties in making appointment decisions. Greater openness also benefits the larger legal community, by enabling discussion about
the merits of the real reasons for awards. Second, the removal of
consistency reduces incentives to "massage" the facts of the case before the arbitrators so as to analogize or distinguish the case from earlier awards. Similarly, it diminishes the need to "reinterpret" the
holdings of earlier decisions. 173 Instead, tribunals can engage in
frank discussions about their disagreements with past awards. The
decision on jurisdiction in SGS v. Philippinesprovides an example of
such outspokenness. The tribunal in that case stated that it disagreed

172. The notion that adjudicators should question the reasons for their decisions is, of
course, a normative proposition. Some Legal Realists have pointed out that rationalization
can be a powerful tool for masking the influences of biases. See generally JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
173. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 146, at 819 ("Lower court judges more often
nullify the doctrine through less visible subterfuge ....
[W]hen judges care deeply about a
particular legal issue but disagree with existing precedent, they often attempt to subvert the
doctrine and free themselves from its fetters by stretching to distinguish the holdings of the
higher courts."); Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (noting "the stretching or shrinking of precedents in every
washing"); Comment, The Attitude of Lower Courts to Changing Precedents, 50 YALE L.J.
1448, 1449 (1941) ("[Many] precedents have been rejected through the stratagem of
distinguishment; others have been the subject of conscious judicial oversight.
As a
consequence, judicial discretion among 'inferior' judges is not so confined and limited as
legal theorists would have it."); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 62 (1960) ("[O]nly in times of stagnation or decay does [the
judicial] system even faintly resemble ... a picture of detailed dictation by the precedents
....
"); qf Timothy Schwarz, Cases Time Forgot: Why Judges Can Sometimes Ignore
ControllingPrecedent, 56 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1475 (2007) (explaining that precedent can be
followed, distinguished, overruled, treated as mistaken or ignored).
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on certain points with a decision rendered a few months earlier in a
sister case, SGS v. Pakistan,174 and explained why it was under no
constraint to follow the earlier award:
As will become clear, the present Tribunal does not in
all respects agree with the conclusions reached by the
SGS v. Pakistan Tribunal on issues of the interpretation of arguably similar language in the SwissPhilippines BIT. This raises a question whether,
nonetheless, the present Tribunal should defer to the
answers given by the SGS v. Pakistan Tribunal ....

In the Tribunal's view, although different tribunals
constituted under the ICSID system should in general
seek to act consistently with each other, in the end it
must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence in
accordance with the applicable law .

. .

. Moreover

there is no doctrine of precedent in international law,
if by precedent is meant a rule of the binding effect of
a single decision. There is no hierarchy of international tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good
reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve
issues for all later tribunals. 175
In court systems, in the words of Alec Stone Sweet,
"[p]recedent camouflages lawmaking, while enabling it." 176 In arbitration, there are no compelling reasons for engaging in such duplicity. By letting go of consistency as a goal and precedent as the method to achieve it, arbitrators do not need to face the choice between
reaching a decision that they believe to be incorrect or concealing
what they are doing. As SGS v. Philippines demonstrates, the open
expression of disagreement with earlier awards could foster a continuing dialogue between tribunals. A secondary, but significant, benefit is that greater transparency stimulates scholarly debate on the merits of different decisions, allowing future tribunals to draw on richer
scholarship.

174.

SGS Socidt&Gdndrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID

Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Aug. 6, 2003).

175.

SGS Socidt& Gdn~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID

Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction 1 97 (Jan. 29,

2004) (footnotes omitted).
176.

Alec Stone Sweet, The European Court and Integration, in ALEC STONE SWEET,

THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 1, 10 (2004).
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4. Constraining Discretion
Although consistency is achieved at the expense of accuracy,
sincerity and transparency, its effects on the decision-making process
are not all negative. Perhaps the strongest argument for asking that
arbitrators give some consideration to consistency is that such a norm
may reduce idiosyncratic decision-making.
First, by limiting subjectivity, consistency could function as a
safeguard against arbitrariness. Even though investment arbitrators
are not part of an institution in the way court judges are, their decisions should not be random, or worse, based on improper motivations. Sophisticated jurists can, and often will, disagree on whether
specific decisions can be reconciled. Still, the argument would go, a
consistency standard can be useful standard for preventing outlier decisions. 177
By its nature, however, arbitration may not lend itself well to
evaluation of fairness over time. Perhaps what matters most in arbitration is not how a judgment stacks up against other awards in comparable cases, but whether the parties to a specific dispute have been
given a fair shake. This understanding of fairness requires that arbitrators be receptive to arguments that may not have convinced other
tribunals. Moreover, although the institution of the party-appointed
arbitrator creates incentives for bias, 178 it also empowers the parties
to prevent the appointment of a tribunal that, acting as a collective,
177. C 'Kim, supra note 23, at 258 (noting that "[t]he norm of coherence acts as a
check against arbitrators' discretion").
178. Several experienced arbitrators have recently called for abolition of partyappointment in international arbitration (including investor-state arbitration), arguing that

this system creates incentives that are at odds with true impartiality. Jan Paulsson, Moral
Hazard in InternationalDispute Resolution: InauguralLecture, University of Miami School
of Law (Apr. 10, 2010), available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12773749999
020/paulsson moral hazard.pdf; Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution of the PartyAppointed Arbitrator, Columbia FDI Perspectives (Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.

vcc.columbia.edu/content/pernicious-institution-party-appointed-arbitrator.
Unsurprisingly,
these proposals have been met with resistance. Herman Manuel Duarte, Fixing the Way
Multi-Arbitrator Tribunals Are Formed, ABA Section of Litigation (Oct. 27, 2011),
available at http:Happs.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/internationa/articles/fal1201 Imulti-arbitrator-tribunals-unilateral-appointments.html;
Alexis Mourre, Are Unilateral
Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson's Moral Hazard in InternationalArbitration,
KLUWER

ARBITRATION

BLOG

(Oct.

5,

2010),

http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/

2010/10/05/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible-on-j an-paulssonE2% 80% 99s-moralhazard-in-international-arbitration. See also Brower & Schill, supra note 113, at 491 92
(noting that in investment arbitration, "[w]hat is primarily important is the arbitrator's
reputation for impartial and independent judgment").
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would reach an idiosyncratic result.
A second, and perhaps stronger, argument is that a norm requiring some deference to earlier awards anchors the decisionmaking process. The process of analogizing and distinguishing earlier cases arguably is a methodology that ensures some intellectual rigor. In the face of consistency among a great amount of prior decisions, perhaps the most appropriate response is humility and respect
for the collective judgment of all of the adjudicators who have considered the same legal issues. 179 Arbitrators, to invoke Dworkin's
metaphor, should not break the chain lightly. The imposition of certain decisional burdens-for example, a requirement that arbitrators
deviate from a consistent line of decisions only for compelling reasons-fosters diligence whenever a tribunal considers departing from
the prevailing case law. 180
Of course, investment arbitrators should study earlier decisions and allow themselves to be convinced by their reasoning. The
decisions of tribunals who have grappled with the same legal questions are a particularly useful source. Even if a tribunal ends up disagreeing with earlier awards, its decision will be more deliberate if it
has been tested against the reasoning of other tribunals. The beneficial effects of serious consideration of earlier awards without losing
sight of a tribunal's autonomy were insightfully described in the
award rendered by an ICSID panel in 2005 in AES Corp. v. Argentine
Republic:
Each tribunal remains sovereign and may retain, as it
is confirmed by ICSID practice, a different solution
for resolving the same problem; but decisions on jurisdiction dealing with the same or very similar issues
may at least indicate some lines of reasoning of real
interest; this Tribunal may consider them in order to
compare its own positions with those already adopted
by its predecessors and, if it shares the views already
expressed by one or more of these tribunals on a specific point of law, it is free to adopt the same solution. 181
The additional constraint imposed by a consistency norm,
179.

1 thank participants of the 2012 ITA Winter Forum, especially William Dodge, for

this point.
180. C ' Cheng, supra note 84, at 1020-21 (describing the relationship between
precedent and control of adjudication process).
181. AES Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 30 (Apr. 26, 2005).
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however, is unnecessary. The current framework does not grant investment arbitrators unfettered discretion to reach whichever decision
they believe is "just" or "fair." As we have seen, the ICSID Convention instructs arbitrators to identify the applicable rules of national or international law, and apply those. 182 Where the law leaves
room for discretion, there are no compelling reasons to demand that
arbitrators defer to the way an earlier tribunal has exercised its discretion. After all, each tribunal is appointed in accordance with the
parties' agreement to adjudicate their specific dispute. A further
check is provided by the explicit requirement that investment tribunals provide reasons for their decisions. 183 Non-compliance with this
requirement renders an award vulnerable to annulment. 184 As a practical matter, meeting the reason-giving requirement is more burdensome for tribunals that deviate from prevailing case law. This course
of action requires more work and poses reputational risks, at least
when earlier awards have not been heavily criticized. 185 The natural
inclination will therefore be to follow earlier awards, especially when
they are convincingly reasoned. 186 It is unlikely that arbitrators will
decide to part ways with a consistent line of awards without engaging
in thorough research and serious deliberation.
Lastly, a significant check exists in the form of the court of
public opinion. Unlike arbitrators in most other fields, and perhaps
many trial court judges, investment arbitrators (at least in ICSID arbitrations) operate in the spotlights. Their awards are not only published, but they tend to be scrutinized, analyzed and criticized by an187
nulment committees, other tribunals and the academic community.
The attention for individual awards may fade somewhat due to the
exponential growth of investment arbitrations, but decisions that are
perceived as outrageous will continue to attract attention.
In sum, the relatively public forum in which investment arbitration takes place, together with the legitimacy check performed by
the annulment remedy and the natural pull that emanates from earlier
182.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

183. Schwartzman, supra note 162, at 998 1001 (discussing how "principle of legal
justification" helps reduce arbitrariness in judging).
184. For example, the Enron and Sempra awards were annulled for failure to state
reasons. See supra notes 76 79 and accompanying text.
185. C . Cheng, supra note 84, at 1046 (noting that arbitrators further their reputational
interests by applying a precedent method).
186. C . DuXBuRY, supra note 152, at 154 ("Favouring the path of least resistance is
certainly a reason for following precedent, but it will very often be the wrong reason.").
187.

Brower & Schill, supra note 113, at 492-93.
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awards, already provide some safeguards against undue arbitrariness
in decision-making. In practice, the existence of a consistent line of
cases in practice results in stricter explanatory burdens for arbitrators
who disagree with those decisions. The imposition of additional decisional burdens is unnecessary and detrimental to the quality of adjudication.
C. The Value of Inconsistency
There is no question that we will continue to perceive inconsistent awards as troubling. Yet the intuition that something is amiss
when different tribunals reach outcomes or adopt rationales that seem
to be at odds should be the beginning, not the end of the inquiry.
Let us revisit the Argentina cases discussed in Part I.B, and
consider some explanations for the inconsistent outcomes and reasoning in the awards. First, the inconsistencies may be the result of the
arbitrators' struggle to find the best answer in a hard case. Possibly,
the Continental tribunal decided to use a different approach to the
necessity defense because it concluded that earlier awards did not
provide satisfactory answers. Perhaps the tribunal was influenced by
the findings of the CMS annulment committee, which let the award
stand but pointed out several legal errors, or by academic literature
that was highly critical of the outcomes and the reasoning in earlier
awards. Thus, one explanation for the inconsistent results could be
that adjudicators reached the insight that earlier awards had been
wrongly decided. Inconsistency may thus enable the detection of errors. If this is the case, our criticisms should not be directed at inconsistency, but at the wrongness of the earlier awards. 188 Relatedly, a
systematic tolerance of inconsistency also provides the flexibility for
tribunals to revisit what the "correct" answer is when adaptation is
warranted due to changing circumstances. 189
Another possibility is that the different outcomes and reasoning reflect disagreement about what the law is, or how it must be applied to a particular set of facts. In theory, most of us readily accept
that law is indeterminate, and that reasonable jurists may disagree on
the proper application of legal standards. Similarly, we realize that
188. See John C. McCoid II, InconsistentJudgments, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487,488
(1991) ("Obviously, if two decisions are inconsistent, one of them must be wrong. Without
more, however, the evil does not lie in the inconsistency; it lies in the erroneous decision.
Inconsistency is merely a sign that error exists, a symptom of something bad, but not itself
evil.").
189.

C . John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 105 (1987).
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facts can be highly contested and that different fact-finders may reach
inconsistent conclusions. Yet inconsistency that stares us in the face,
as it does in the Argentina cases, reveals that we may not be quite so
comfortable with the role of luck in adjudication. 190 And even
though practitioners openly acknowledge that the selection of a tribunal is the most important factor in any arbitration, the reality that
the identity of the arbitrators may have affected the outcome is a hard
one to stomach for parties on the losing end. Of course, the flip side
is that if each case is a new one, litigants should be less disadvantaged by unfavorable predispositions of tribunals who have decided
similar disputes in the past.
Yet another reading of the Argentina cases could be that the
applicability of the necessity defense presented a close case. If consistency is to have any weight in a tribunal's deliberations, "close
call" situations would present the strongest case for following determinations of earlier tribunals. After all, if a tribunal is already on the
fence, a small shift in opinion may not seem to be a big deal. This
course of action, however, would sacrifice accuracy and fairness on
the altar of a consistency ideal. It would expose Argentina to almost
unlimited liability in dozens of cases based on a call made by the tribunal that happened to write the first award. Moreover, policy considerations could end up being more dominant: the awareness of the
significance of the first award could easily make a tribunal hesitant to
rule against a sovereign, especially if the case is a close one. Again,
in legal systems there may be strong justifications for insisting on
coherence in drawing these lines. However, in the context of investment treaty arbitration, the reasons for striking the balance differently
are more compelling.
Lastly, advocacy may well have played a role. Perhaps Argentina put up a stronger case in some arbitrations, and its opponents
may not have been equally skillful at making their case. It makes
sense that Argentina, as a repeat player, built a more convincing factual record and sharpened its legal arguments over time.
All that being said, inconsistency could signal improper decision-making. We would be right, for example, to question the impartiality of a repeat arbitrator whose awards are inconsistent from one

190. For these reasons, judges have incentives to downplay the extent to which they
engage in lawmaking. Martin Shapiro has explained that the message judges send to losing
parties is: "You did not lose because we the judges chose that you should lose. You lost
because the law required that you should lose." He notes that "[t]his paradox means that
although every court makes law in a few of its cases, judges almost always deny that they
make law." Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 156 (1994).
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case to the next but unfailingly come out in favor of the side that appointed him or her. 191 Here again, it is not the inconsistency itself
that is the problem, but rather the suspected bias. If anything, overt
inconsistency would help reveal these underlying problems. 192 As a
general matter, however, inconsistency is too blunt a tool to be used
as a proxy for other adjudication values. Ultimately, each arbitral
decision should be judged on its own merits.
Inconsistency, in sum, is valuable because it keeps the investment arbitration community vigilant. It makes us question the
reasons for differences between awards, and look for explanations in
the reasoning in the awards and in external factors. The inquiries and
debates triggered by inconsistent adjudication further contribute to
the development and refinement of substantive and procedural standards.
IV. PRECEDENT

REVISITED

Most arguments for introducing precedent into investment arbitration are premised on the view that greater consistency in arbitral
decision-making is desirable. My rejection of this view logically encompasses a rejection of precedent, in the sense of a constraint, however slight, on decision-making by investment arbitrators.
In this last Part, I first explain how investment arbitrators
should treat past awards and decisions. I conclude with some observations about the significance of the forward-looking aspects of precedent for investor-state arbitration.
A. Backward-Looking Constraints
Earlier in this Article, I described the distinction Judge Posner
made in Colby v. J.C. Penney Co. between decisions from sister appellate courts, which are entitled to minor deference, and those from
district courts, which should be given no deference. 193 Those who
wish to promote consistency in investor-state arbitration through persuasive precedent essentially support adoption of the standard Judge
191. See, e.g., Schneiderman, supra note 31 (identifying a potential role of arbitrator
bias in the conflicting Argentina awards).
192. Of course, a smart arbitrator who is biased will instead try to achieve results that
are favorable for the party who appointed him or her, but give off the appearance of
consistency. Arbitrator bias is therefore often not easy to detect and even harder to prove.
193.

See supra Part II.B.1.
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Posner applies to non-binding appellate decisions. In contrast, my
rejection of a consistency norm means that arbitrators ought to approach earlier awards with the attitude district court judges should
take vis- -vis decisions from their peers. Arbitrators in investor-state
disputes, in other words, should not be subject to the backwardlooking constraints that we tend to view as the essence of precedent. 194
It is important, however, to clarify how arbitrators should
treat earlier awards. By submitting that arbitrators should not be constrained by earlier awards, I don't argue that arbitrators should decide
in a vacuum, nor do I argue that they should not familiarize themselves with relevant awards and decisions. In fact, it is critical that
arbitrators review decisions from other tribunals and annulment
committees. First, while earlier awards are not law, they are often
useful in helping arbitrators identify what the law requires. 195 The
role played by arbitral decisions is in this sense similar to that of
scholarly works. Of course, there are significant differences between
the nature of adjudication and scholarship, which are reflected in the
products that result from the practices. On the one hand, decisions
from other adjudicators may be more useful as a resource. After all,
arbitrators in other cases are similarly situated in that they resolve real-world disputes. 196 On the other hand, scholarly works can be useful precisely because academics have more freedom. Academic writing tends not to be colored by the particularities of a specific case,
including the arguments and materials submitted by the parties. Each
type of source comes with its strengths and weaknesses, and there is
no reason (at least in the context of investment treaty arbitration) to
systematically favor one over another. 197
In addition to pointing tribunals to the rules of law, the reasoning in earlier awards may be so compelling that a tribunal becomes convinced that it represents an accurate interpretation and application of the law. This is the core of persuasive authority.
Tribunals in investor-state disputes should therefore consider the rea-

194.

Schauer, Precedent, supra note 8, at 572.

195. Orakhelashvili, supra note 10, at 169 ("Arbitral awards can be an elucidation of
international law, not a precedent, and possess no a priori value.").
196. Cf Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of PersuasiveAuthority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55,
71 (2009).
197. Whatever the merits of Chad Flanders' argument that in court systems court
decisions are "super persuasive" compared to other persuasive authorities (such as law
review articles), see Flanders, supranote 196, at 74 76, there appear to be strong arguments

against identifying a similar hierarchy in investment treaty arbitration.
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soning of earlier awards, and carefully weigh competing answers to
the questions their cases present. And it is unproblematic for tribunals to adopt solutions from earlier awards and decisions on the basis
that they are convinced by the strength of the reasoning. Yet arbitrators should be careful not to cross the line into "following" earlier
awards for the sake of promoting consistency.
I want to conclude this section with a warning. In light of the
natural inclination to give some weight to earlier decisions that have
no claim to authority, one may wonder whether the distinction Judge
Posner has drawn between non-binding appellate court decisions and
district court decisions has any practical significance. The difference, after all, is subtle, as district and circuit court judges do not face
significant constraints in deciding whether to follow awards from sister appellate courts. Translated to the arbitration context, the question could be: what is the harm of converting an informal practice
into a norm? In response, I submit that the attitude with which adjudicators are asked to approach their task is of some importance. In
part, this is because of the likely consequences that flow from the
mindset of an adjudicator. Arbitrators are not machines, and they
cannot simply turn off informal considerations that motivate them at
a subconscious level. It is inevitable that they are influenced by factors beyond the intrinsic persuasiveness of earlier awards. The pull
of consistency is always there, and may be strengthened by several
factors including the tribunal members' personal assessments of the
arbitrators who rendered an earlier award, or the praise or criticism
awards have encountered. Rather than imposing a consistency norm,
we should therefore encourage arbitrators to be wary of the natural
inclination to follow earlier awards. Ultimately, the emphasis should
be on the responsibility of each tribunal to make an independent determination of how a dispute should be resolved under applicable
law. 198
In addition, a consistency norm-even a weak one-would
affect the expectations of the parties to disputes and of the international investment community at large. If earlier awards are entitled
to even a small amount of deference, arbitrators who choose not to
follow them may be subject to disapproval. If, on the other hand, the
arbitration community expects a tribunal to reach an independent decision on the case before it, aided by an honest assessment of the

198. Cf Roberts, supra note 12, at 179 (comparing investment treaty awards to "a
house of cards built largely by reference to other tribunal awards and academic opinions,
with little consideration of the views and practices of states in general or the treaty parties in

particular").
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merits of earlier awards, arbitrators in turn will feel empowered to
deviate from earlier awards that they believe were wrong. Even
though tribunals will often end up adopting the reasoning in earlier
cases, they should do so from a position of freedom. 199
B. Forward-LookingConstraints
The rejection of any obligation to accord deference to past
awards does not necessarily imply a denunciation of the lawmaking
role of arbitrators. As a matter of principle, there is nothing about an
autonomous decision-making model that renders it incompatible with
lawmaking conduct.20 0 In fact, the role played by arbitral awards in
the development of substantive law has consequences for decisionmaking as well as reason-giving.
The forward-looking aspects of investment arbitration present
a dilemma for arbitrators. Should they focus only on the dispute they
are resolving? Or should they be mindful of the fact that their awards
will be read by a broader audience, including future tribunals? There
are strong arguments for requiring a narrow focus on the resolution
of the dispute at hand. After all, arbitrators are appointed and paid by
parties to resolve a particular dispute between the parties that appointed them, not to set the stage for other cases. Moreover, the forward-looking aspects of adjudication may detract from the sincerity
that enables arbitrators to reach the best decision in a particular case.
Interestingly, Maxwell Steams has suggested that the Condorcet Jury
Theorem is of reduced utility as a tool for understanding appellate
adjudication. The reason is that the awareness that decisions are
precedent-setting interferes with some of the assumptions that under20 1
lie the autonomous decision-making ideal.
In practice, however, investment arbitrators are keenly aware
199. Arbitral awards that state arbitrators should follow consistent lines of cases often
use the word "duty" in this context. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. It appears,
therefore, that at least some arbitrators sense a degree of constraint in dealing with earlier
awards. The awards do not, however, explain where this duty comes from.
200. C . Caminker, supra note 146, at 826 (noting that one could imagine a regime in
which courts "behave as autonomous law-declaring actors. Under such a system, each
individual court would decide every case according to its own best judgment, unrestricted by
the precedents of higher courts ....

In such a non-precedent-based hierarchy, inferior courts

would function more as autonomous interpretive agents than as messengers for an oracular
Supreme Court"); Alexander, supra note 6, at 28 ("[C]ourts could decide cases 'as if'
particular rules existed in order to further the 'rule of law' values.").
201. Maxwell L. Steams, The CondorcetJury Theorem and Judicial Decision-making:
A Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 125, 125-26 (2002).
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that their decisions will influence the behavior of constituents in investment law, and inform the decision-making of adjudicators in future disputes. 20 2 Of course, the effects of the forward-looking aspects
of adjudication are stronger in a system in which adjudicators know
that their decisions will formally bind other adjudicators (and constrain their own freedom). In precedent-based systems, in other
words, the forward-looking aspects of decision-making are derivative
of the backward-looking ones. Investment arbitration, however, provides an example of how the awareness of adjudicators that they contribute to the development of law affects decision-making even in the
absence of backward-looking constraints. Specifically, the very notion of law implies a certain level of generality. 20 3 Arguably, the
ICSID Convention's mandate to resolve disputes in accordance with
applicable "law" already imposes an implicit obligation on investment arbitrators to apply universalizable norms. 204 The notion that
investment arbitrators not only apply law, but also shape it, strengthens this requirement. The effect of the lawmaking aspects on arbitral
decision-making is especially pronounced when comparing investment arbitrators to arbitrators in, for example, international commercial disputes. Commercial arbitrators and investment arbitrators are,
in a sense, each other's mirror images. Commercial arbitrators follow precedent from the jurisdictions whose laws they apply but do
not participate in the development of law, while investment arbitrators create law without being under an obligation to treat earlier decisions as authoritative.
Awareness of the larger impact of awards may thus detract, to
some extent, from achieving the best result in the case at hand. On
the other hand, it also forces investment arbitrators to think about the
dispute before them as one that falls in a category of cases. This exercise requires thinking through the applications of the law outside
the confines of the specific disputes before them. The forwardlooking aspects of investment arbitration, by broadening the scope of
the inquiry, may ultimately result in better adjudication in individual
cases.
The fact that arbitral awards help shape the meaning of terms
in investment treaties also gives rise to an obligation to be transparent
about the reasons for decisions. Presumably, arbitrators whose
awards are confidential direct their reasoning primarily at the parties,
202.

Cf Schauer, Precedent,supranote 8, at 572 75.

203. Waldron, supra note 134, at 18-20; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of/Law as a
Law ofRules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989).
204.

See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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although they may also take care to satisfy courts in enforcement
challenges. The audience of investment arbitrators, on the other
hand, also includes their peers. Investment arbitrators should aim to
provide reasons that will persuade future adjudicators that the decisions that were made are the right ones. Among other things, this
means that tribunals should identify where they disagree with earlier
tribunals, and provide reasons for siding with one camp when there is
already divergence, or for deviating from lines of consistent cases.
Interestingly, these obligations do not arise out of formal, backwardlooking constraints. Rather, the reasons for these obligations lie in
the forward-looking aspects of precedent. 20 5 An award gains in persuasive force if it explains how it is situated in the context of relevant
case law and what the reasons are for adopting or rejecting earlier interpretations or applications. Thus, the existence of earlier awards on
point-especially if there is a consistent line of awards-imposes additional explanatory burdens. This should not, however, be equated
with a decisional constraint.206
The Glamis Gold award rendered in 2009 by an ICSID tribunal describes the disciplining effect that may emanate from an
awareness of a decision's broader implications:
[T]his Tribunal, in undertaking its primary mandate of
resolving this particular dispute, does so with an
awareness of the context within which it operates.
The Tribunal emphasizes that it in no way views its
awareness of the context in which it operates as justifying (or indeed requiring) a departure from its duty to
focus on the specific case before it. Rather it views its
awareness of operating in this context as a discipline
upon its reasoning that does not alter the Tribunal's
decision, but rather guides and aides the Tribunal in
205.

The consent-based nature of arbitration provides another basis for requiring that

arbitrators address awards and decisions that are discussed in the parties' submissions.
Possibly, the requirements that ICSID awards "deal with every question submitted to the

Tribunal" and that they state the reasons for the award provide a basis for inferring such an
obligation. ICSID Convention, supra note 22, art. 48(3). 1 thank Andrea Bjorklund and
Andrew Newcombe for this point.
206. Stephan Schill has noted that "[t]he more established precedent becomes, and the
more investment treaty tribunals align themselves with a certain line of jurisprudence, the
more difficult it becomes to meet that burden and to convince tribunals to adopt solutions
that deviate from prior practice." Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty
Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1083, 1101 02 (2011). While this may be true
as a descriptive matter, I disagree with any suggestion that arbitrators should consider
themselves constrained by "established" jurisprudence.
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simultaneously supporting
the system of which it is
207
only a temporary part.
My rejection of backward-looking constraints imposed by
precedent is based on the position that precedent should not be used
as a means to achieve consistency in arbitration. Disentangled from
this instrumental role, however, precedent provides a useful lens
through which to study the influence of past awards and future disputes on the decision-making process in investment arbitration. It
helps make sense of the unique task arbitrators in investor-state disputes face in reconciling their obligations to the parties who appointed them with the awareness that the effects of their decisions may extend far beyond the dispute they are resolving.
CONCLUSION

This Article warns of the costs that come with consistency in
adjudication, and counsels against the implementation of precedent in
investor-state arbitration. The justifications that support a consistency norm in court systems take on diminished importance in the arbitration context. Moreover, attempts to promote consistency interfere
with adjudication values that are more important for investment law
and arbitration. These include autonomous decision-making, a commitment to identifying the best legal answer (even if reasonable jurists may disagree about what that is in any given context), and transparency about the reasons for a disposition and the extent of any
disagreement with earlier awards.
Although consistency should not factor into arbitral decisionmaking, it is inevitable that earlier decisions will, and do, influence
arbitrators. Furthermore, the existence of a consensus among tribunals who have decided specific questions will naturally raise the
stakes for tribunals who disagree. Yet cementing this practice into a
doctrine of precedent will do little good and has the potential to be
harmful. Instead, arbitrators should be conscious of the natural inclination to follow earlier decisions, and ensure that they reach independent decisions about the legal and factual issues presented in the
cases before them.
Lastly, investment arbitrators' role in developing substantive
international law comes with responsibilities that are unique in the
arbitration universe. In deciding specific disputes, investment arbi207.

Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL Award

2009), available at http://italaw.com/documents/GlamisAward_001 .pdf.
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trators ought to be mindful of the broader and longer-term implications of their decisions. Although the primary goal of awards remains to explain the disposition to the parties, tribunals must provide
reasons with an eye toward the larger investment community, including future tribunals. Intriguingly, investment arbitrators should conceive of themselves as norm creators, even if neither they, nor future
tribunals, are under any constraint to be norm followers.

